

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
AND  
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION**

**SECURITY INDEX**

**FILE NUMBER: 100-358086**

**SECTION : 32**



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

---

## **NOTICE**

**THE BEST COPIES OBTAINABLE ARE INCLUDED IN THE REPRODUCTION OF THE FILE. PAGES INCLUDED THAT ARE BLURRED, LIGHT OR OTHERWISE DIFFICULT TO READ ARE THE RESULT OF THE CONDITION AND OR COLOR OF THE ORIGINALS PROVIDED. THESE ARE THE BEST COPIES AVAILABLE.**

---

list

1816

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. [REDACTED]

DATE: December 21,  
1954

FROM : Mr. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX LIST

The Security Index list as of December 15, 1954 has been prepared. One copy is attached herewith for transmittal to the SAC, Quantico, for retention in his personal custody with the other vital records maintained at the FBI Academy.

## RECOMMENDATION:

1. That this memorandum and attached list be forwarded to the SAC, Quantico, marked Personal and Confidential, Registered, Return Receipt Requested.

2. That upon receipt, the SAC, Quantico, place the attached list with the other vital records maintained at Quantico, personally destroy by burning the old Security Index list in his possession and note herein that such action has been taken.

3. That thereafter, this memorandum be returned to the Bureau, marked for my attention.

RECORDED

DEC 30 1954

Attachment

(6)

cc - Mr. [REDACTED]  
Mr. [REDACTED]

64 JAN 5 1955

EX-125

BZ  
SWE ✓

UNRECORDED

12-23-54

JJ

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE:  
December 23, 1954

FROM :

SUBJECT:

REVIEW OF SECURITY INDEX CRITERIA

Reference is made to my interim memorandum of 12/13/54, reflecting the steps taken by me concerning the re-evaluation of the criteria currently being used to place a person on the security index, to determine whether they are sound or should be modified in any respect.

Observations submitted by the SACs at New York, Newark, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Washington Field, were carefully discussed by me with Messrs. [initials] In a memorandum from Mr. [initials], dated 12/17/54, captioned SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM, a complete analysis of these observations is made. The memoranda from the five SACs follow the general practice now in use regarding placing individuals on the security index.

The Newark Division suggested that those individuals whose names are placed on the security index because of espionage activities should be considered, at the time of an emergency, from the standpoint of permitting such subjects to remain at large, if such action would serve the interests of our espionage investigations. Newark suggests maintenance of a separate list of such individuals, so that careful evaluation can be made in time of an emergency.

The Bureau is directing Newark's attention to Page 30-C of Section 87-C of the Manual of Instructions, wherein provision is made for placing such persons in the Espionage Subdivision of the Special Section of the Security Index. It is also being suggested to Newark that if the Newark Office has such cases not presently in such a subdivision, these cases should be called to the attention of the Bureau, with appropriate recommendations.

Newark then makes the observation that 109 of their security index subjects are housewives, "some of whom were placed in the security index because they were uncooperative when interviewed." The Executives Conference, on 12/14/54, unanimously recommended, and you approved, the Domestic Intelligence Division's practice of considering an uncooperative attitude on the part of a subject, on interview, as a significant factor in retaining his name in the

UNRECORDED

12-23-54

SOLELY

security index. Though it is very unlikely that the Domestic Intelligence Division has ever approved placing a person on the security index "because they were uncooperative when interviewed," Newark is being instructed to call to the Bureau's attention any cases wherein Newark recommended placing on the security index a person who was uncooperative when interviewed, there being no other subversive indications which would warrant inclusion in the security index under the established criteria.

A letter is being directed to the Los Angeles Office calling attention to its observation that, as a general rule, a person should not be included on the security index merely because of his refusal to identify others who participated with him in subversive activities, and pointing out to Los Angeles that this uncooperative attitude on the part of a subject must be considered, along with all other facts developed in the case, and the extent of his known subversive activities, in arriving at a conclusion as to whether such subject should be included on the security index. This point again pertains to the Executives Conference consideration of the matter of interviews.

The memoranda submitted by the Washington Field, New York and San Francisco Divisions did not contain any comments requiring answer.

Attached is a list of 95 files reviewed for the purpose of determining whether it was felt these persons were properly included in the security index. In my memorandum of 12/13/54, I pointed out that I had selected five borderline types of cases for consultation with Messrs. [redacted], to determine the soundness of the reasoning employed by the field in recommending, and the Bureau in approving, the placing of these persons on the security index. For the sake of discussion and analysis, I raised certain questions in the cases captioned

After oral discussion, I had Mr. [redacted] prepare an analysis memorandum, justifying the inclusion of these subjects in the security index. I feel that these persons have been properly included in the Security Index.

In the [redacted] case, I raised the question as to why the subject had not been interviewed, in view of a lack of information

UNRECORDED

12-23-54

as to Communist activity since 1949. The Executives Conference on 12/14/54 unanimously recommended, and you approved, that subjects concerning whom we have been unable to develop subversive activities subsequent to January 1, 1949, should be required to be interviewed for the purpose of determining their present attitude, to provide a further basis for evaluation as to whether they should continue to be retained on the security index. An SAC letter is being sent to the field covering this point.

In the cases captioned

with alias ( ), and

, with alias ( ),

I dictated memoranda dated 12/20/54 to Mr. , pointing out certain discrepancies and weaknesses in either reporting or interviewing, in connection with the results of contacts with informants. The Milwaukee, New York and Albany offices are being instructed to explain the discrepancies noted and indicate whether there was an inadequacy of reporting or interviewing; also to make any administrative recommendations indicated. As soon as these explanations are received they will be carefully reviewed and recommendations concerning administrative action will be made.

In the case of , I dictated a memorandum 12/16/54 to Mr. , pointing out that there had been a failure on the part of the San Diego office to submit a summary report which was due in January, 1954. The San Diego Office has been requested to submit explanation for failure to prepare this report, and the Domestic Intelligence Division was asked to justify its failure to follow up this case.

The Domestic Intelligence Division has pointed out, in a memorandum dated 12/21/54, that the case is in a closed status, and for the Bureau to follow up closed cases would require a tickler on each security index subject wherein the case had been closed, which would require more than 26,000 ticklers. The Domestic Intelligence Division pointed out that the Executives Conference, on 10/19/51, approved an instruction to the field to follow cases for the yearly summary report by administrative ticklers, and recommended that during field inspections, the inspectors check to see whether these cases were being properly followed.

I believe the Domestic Intelligence Division's explanation is acceptable. Upon receipt of explanation from the San Diego Office, consideration will be given as to any administrative action which need be taken as to their failure to submit the report.

With reference to the Director's instruction that "we should try to find out from what criteria his division is following," memorandum to me dated 12/21/54 indicated that Mr. [redacted] of the Internal Security Division of the Department, stated that a reply will come to us in the next day or so in response to our recent memorandum, and that the Department will indicate clearly that it is using the same criteria as used by the FBI. Upon receipt of this reply, [redacted] will confer with the Department as to the Department's thinking in applying these criteria, using as a basis the case.

**OBSERVATIONS:**

From the foregoing review, it is my conclusion that the criteria are adequate, are sound, and need no modification at this time. It may be necessary to make modifications from time to time in the future, depending upon changing conditions. This is evidenced by the fact that the Domestic Intelligence Division recently presented to the Executives Conference a modification requiring the field to interview persons on the security index concerning whom no evidence had been developed reflecting subversive activities since January, 1949. The primary thing to insure is that the Department is aware of and approves the criteria being used by the FBI. Steps are presently being taken to assure this. It is further believed important to continue to insist that the Department review and adjudicate the cases pertaining to those individuals placed on the security index.

As indicated in the body of this memorandum, I found two files reflecting inadequacy of either reporting or interviewing, and explanations are being requested from the field. I plan to discuss before the Inspectors' Conference, January 4, 1955, the necessity for the inspectors carefully reviewing files in the field for any indications of inadequate reporting and/or interviewing and emphasizing at the inspection conferences with field agents the need for being most thorough in the interviewing and reporting of results of contacts with informants. It obviously does very little good to develop a large number of informants unless these informants are "milked dry" of information of value in their possession concerning subversive activities.

I also plan to include in the talk on investigative techniques which I will be making before the inservice training groups these same points, with a view to endeavoring to improve the field handling of these informants.

PURCHASED  
12-23-54

Upon receipt from the field of any information regarding the inadequacies above referred to, appropriate recommendations will be made concerning any delinquencies noted.

ACTION:  
For your information.

UNRECORDED  
12-23-54

FILES EXAMINED IN CONNECTION WITH  
REVIEW OF SECURITY INDEX CRITERIA

100-335523	100-410266	100-182701
100-335713	100-308898	100-377013
100-354219	100-300106	100-3802
100-310168	100-339237	100-365110
100-368620	100-273478	100-365828
100-174753	100-232975	100-387037
100-373731	100-353166	100-184064
100-11560	100-373520	100-333
100-365830	100-393752	100-325507
100-30840	100-211689	100-212625
100-342609	100-450435	100-310757
100-214294	100-361577	100-388267
100-74859	100-211914	100-382382
100-170239	100-34502	100-410123
100-273076	100-365522	100-403925
100-21546	100-366178	
100-157023	100-287164	
100-362339	100-105437	
100-381135	100-260299	
100-169916	100-51178	
100-385014	100-611520	
100-385871	100-330279	
100-169047	100-325460	
100-372023	100-389021	
100-53049	100-300038	
100-304803	100-391551	
100-285025	100-3655041	
100-160150	100-120009	
100-160150	100-350023	
100-401043	100-397297	
100-29179	100-140176	
100-370240	100-30080	
100-405047	100-369356	
100-364703	100-370483	
100-381323	100-398766	
100-303737	100-363297	
100-387536	100-387043	
100-334487	100-265134	
100-335157	100-394779	
100-363561	100-602343	

ENCLOSURE 1

ENCLOSURE

UNRECORDED

12-21-54

(I) CONTACTS WITH EMPLOYERS -- At a recent conference of industrial officials and Government representatives, a representative of a large manufacturing company which handles military contracts, commented that it was his understanding that certain employees of his company

12/21/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-71

who were under investigation by the FBI had continued to be employed by his company at our request in order to make their whereabouts readily available to the FBI.

Further inquiry into this matter established that the industrial official was in error and that no such requests had been made of his company and no such arrangements existed.

Nevertheless, I want to again emphasize that no Special Agent should either directly or by inference indicate to any employer or employer's representative that an employee should be retained as a matter of convenience to the FBI or to assist us in our investigation.

In connection with security-type investigations in your area, the Bureau is holding you responsible to see that there is no misunderstanding by employers and plant officials as to Bureau policy on this subject matter. It should be made clear that the FBI can make no recommendations regarding what security measures, if any, concerning the employee should be taken by the company and that the FBI makes no request as to either separation or continued employment of the employee.

This matter should be discussed with all Special Agents of your office and the contents of SAC Letter 68, Series 1952, (J), dated July 18, 1952, should be thoroughly reviewed.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

December 27, 1954

PROPOSED CHANGES  
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS  
SECTION 87C

Page 27a - The following changes should be made immediately following the heading (c) Security Index Subjects. The first paragraph should be amended to read as follows:

- I. Security Index subjects who have defected from a subversive movement.

The following paragraph should be inserted as the second paragraph:

Security Index subjects who have not been reported engaged in subversive activities since January 1, 1949, must be interviewed unless there are compelling reasons dictating against an interview in individual cases. In the latter circumstances, each such case should be called to the specific attention of the Bureau, together with the facts rendering an interview undesirable or impossible. Bureau authority must be procured for these interviews in accordance with 87C 6b(7) (d), below.

The third paragraph should be amended to read as follows:

Individuals included in the Security Index are removed at such times as it is definitely indicated that their activities no longer warrant their inclusion in the Index because of defection from and resulting inactivity in a subversive movement.

SEARCHED  
12-18-54

OFFICE MEMORANDUM • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: December 28<sup>th</sup>  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX B-112481 (RS)

From 5:15 p.m. to 6:40 p.m. on December 27, 1954, Section Chief, Supervisor, and \_\_\_\_\_ discussed with \_\_\_\_\_ of the Department the application of criteria used by the Department and the FBI to place or retain individual on the Security Index. You will recall that Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ previously stated that the Department was using the same criteria as the FBI. \_\_\_\_\_ said today that the Department had sent the Bureau a memorandum today stating that the Department used the same criteria as the Bureau.

In opening the discussion I stated that it was, of course, important that the reasoning behind the application of the criteria in Security Index cases should be similar in the Department and the FBI and we were desirous of discussing this with the Department. I pointed out that the Department had reviewed over 3,000 Security Index cases and had approved the retention of the subjects of these cases on the Security Index. I told Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ that as we had previously repeatedly pointed out to the Department, we feel that the Department should review all Security Index cases, and that we would continue to hold this viewpoint until the Department would review all cases. \_\_\_\_\_ said this was an appropriation matter.

I pointed out that recently the Department had reviewed the case of \_\_\_\_\_ and had expressed the opinion that he should be removed from the Security Index, which we did. However, as a starting point, I told \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ we would like to have the Department's reasoning in the \_\_\_\_\_ case. We went over the salient points in the \_\_\_\_\_ case, namely, that a known Soviet agent, \_\_\_\_\_, had introduced \_\_\_\_\_ to his Soviet superior in the 1930's, although there was no indication that \_\_\_\_\_ knew the purpose of the meeting or that \_\_\_\_\_ accepted an assignment from the Soviet; that Dr. \_\_\_\_\_ had strongly identified \_\_\_\_\_ as the individual visited by \_\_\_\_\_ and his wife, \_\_\_\_\_, and her mother, \_\_\_\_\_, at \_\_\_\_\_ home in 1946 and that the \_\_\_\_\_ had praised \_\_\_\_\_ as an individual friendly to the Communist Party (CP) and of value as a good friend of the party or movement and "it was good to have him in the position he was in"; that \_\_\_\_\_ had associated with CP members, although he claimed this to be in

a social way only; that had attended a CP meeting, although he explained this by saying it had not been identified as such; that was not fully cooperative when interviewed by agents and first denied registration in the American Labor Party for a period of 8 years, but later admitted same.

Mr. [redacted], who had made the decision for the Department in the [redacted] case, stated that from a careful review of the reports in the case there was no showing of actual Communist activities on the part of [redacted] and, therefore, the allegations by the [redacted] stood alone with no supporting data. [redacted] said that he felt that should not be on the Government pay roll, but that this was a matter for the Loyalty Board to decide; however, [redacted] felt that there was no definite showing that [redacted] was a potential danger in the event of an emergency. It was pointed out to Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted] that the significant factor in the [redacted] case was the identification by [redacted] of [redacted] as the individual to whom the remarks of the [redacted] applied, the significance of which lay in the espionage or potential sabotage field rather than Communist activities; that if [redacted] is what [redacted] allege, he would be in a position in an emergency to perform sabotage or espionage at the Brooklyn Navy Yard where he has a sensitive position. There was considerable discussion of the various factors involved in this case; however, we did not attempt to argue the case or change the Department's position. We stated that we wanted the Department's reasoning as it might affect other cases on the Security 1

Mr. [redacted] stated that in his opinion there were no principles laid down in the Department's decision on the [redacted] case, that the Department's decision had been arrived at in the main from the lack of Communist activities on the part of [redacted].

OBSERVATION:

Insofar as the [redacted] case is concerned, I personally feel that the Department reached its conclusion first, through a failure to recognize the espionage and sabotage potentials in the case and second, as a result of the Loyalty Board hearing which had already ruled that [redacted] was eligible for continued employment. We are continuing the investigation on a special basis for the purpose of developing any possible additional facts which the Department should further consider in the case.

INTERVIEWS WITH SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS:

We further discussed with Messrs. Foley and Doherty regarding interviews with Security Index subjects. We advised that we interview Security Index subjects and persons under investigation for several specific reasons, such as: To develop informants; to cause disruption within the CP; to ascertain the attitude and current activities of the subject when this appears to be necessary. We stated that where the subject is completely uncooperative with the Government or where the subject indicates positively that he is still active as a Communist or on the other hand where he is completely cooperative there is no problem as to the action to be taken. However, in between those two extremes we have persons who upon interview fall into the following three categories: A. Interviews where the subject is entirely uncooperative, such as refusing to even talk to the interviewing agent; B. Interviews where the subject cooperates partly by admitting his past Communist activities, but refuses to discuss other information in his possession concerning the CP; and C. Interviews wherein subjects pretend to cooperate by lying to the interviewing agent as borne out by definite information in our files.

Mr. Foley was advised that the Bureau is following the policy of considering interviews in the above three categories as factors to retain or place on the Security Index providing, of course, that other information developed during the investigation warrants such action. In other words, if investigation has developed subversive activities, past or present, on the part of the subject and if he is interviewed to bring his activities up to date or to provide an additional factor for consideration we consider interviews resulting along lines of A, B and C above as a factor in retaining or placing an individual on the Security Index.

Messrs. Foley and Doherty were in complete agreement with the Bureau in this respect. I told them we would verify in writing our discussion on the subject of interviews in order that the Department can consider this during their review of Security Index cases and that we would state in our memorandum that Messrs. Foley and Doherty agreed with the policy set forth above.

CASE FILE  
12-23-52

ACTIONS:

We are drafting a memorandum to the Attorney General  
with copies to Rogers and Tompkins along this line.

attached

AS

rot

jm ✓

✓

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

FBI ATTACHED CIRCULAR

December 20, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION OF PERSONS  
CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE  
AND PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES

My memorandum of December 20, 1954, set forth, in accordance with your request, the general criteria or standards utilized in determining whether or not individuals should be included on the list of persons to be considered for apprehension in an emergency under the above-captioned program. The FBI has conducted and continues to conduct interviews with subjects of security type investigations where the investigation is primarily for the purpose of determining the potential dangerousness of the individual. These interviews are primarily directed toward three goals: to develop informants within the Communist Party or other subversive organizations; to further disrupt the activities of subversive organizations; and to assist in a current evaluation of the potential dangerousness of the particular subject.

Where the subject of one of these investigations, upon interview, is completely cooperative with the government and furnishes all information in his possession and assists the government, or where the subject is uncooperative and admits continued Communist or subversive affiliation, there is no problem in so far as the Security Index is concerned. In the first instance the subject is removed from the Security Index and in the second instance he is placed or retained on the Security Index. Between these two extremes, interviews conducted of subjects may be broken down into three types, as follows:

(1) Interviews where the subject is entirely uncooperative, such as refusing even to talk to the interviewing agents;

(2) Interviews where a subject cooperates partially by admitting his past Communist or other subversive affiliation, but refuse to identify his associates in the Communist Party or other subversive organizations and refuses to discuss other information in his possession concerning such organizations; and,

The Attorney General

URGENT

12-28-54

(B) Interviews wherein a subject pretends to cooperate by lying to the interviewing agents, as borne out by definite information in our files.

This Bureau has followed the policy of considering any interviews falling within the above three categories as a factor to be considered in connection with placing or retaining a subject's name on the Security Index. In other words, if investigation has developed subversive activities, past or present, on the part of a subject, and if he is interviewed to bring his activities up to date or to provide an additional factor for consideration, we consider interviews in the above three categories as a factor in retaining or placing an individual on the Security Index. Our policy in this respect takes into account Communist Party instructions to its members that, where necessary, they omit their own past Communist activities in an effort to allay the suspicions of the FBI. We also take into account the Communist Party "eloper" program whereby Communist members are instructed to disassociate themselves entirely from Communist Party activities and remain quiescent until such time as the Party has need to call upon them for action. In addition, we take cognizance of the Communist Party's "colonization" program whereby Communists - Party members, but publicly known as such, are instructed to assume positions in industry and elsewhere, and in so doing, to remain aloof from Communist activities in order that when the appropriate time comes they may be in a position to assist the Communist Party through the positions attained by them.

A discussion was held with Morris and [redacted] of the Department on December 27, 1953, concerning this matter, at which time the above data were made available to Morris, Foley and Scherry. They expressed themselves as in complete agreement with the Bureau's policy, as set forth above. The purpose of this memorandum is to acquaint you with the procedures being followed, the agreement of the Department officials, and to make available in writing to the Department these procedures for the maintenance in connection with the review of Security Index cases by the Department.

Scc - Mr.  
Deputy Attorney General

Scc - Assistant Attorney General

Office Mem. *dmw*, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 1/4/55

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
SEMI-ANNUAL VERIFICATIONS

In compliance with Manual of Instructions, Vol. 3,  
Section 87C, page 31A:

The Los Angeles Office currently has 4171 active  
Security Index cards. This office continues to verify infor-  
mation on one-sixth of the Security Index cards each month.

All Security Index cards of the Los Angeles Office  
have been verified or are now in process of being verified for  
the period of the past six months.

UNCLASSIFIED

1-2-55

(F) SECURITY INDEX / INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECTS — In some of our Security Index cases there have been no reported activities in subversive groups over extended periods. Further, no indications of defection have been received in these cases and as a result the subjects have been retained in the Security Index.

In order to resolve the question of the continued adherence to subversive principles by these individuals, the following instructions are to be placed into effect immediately. All Security Index subjects who have not been identified with any subversive activities since January 1, 1949, must be interviewed unless there are compelling reasons dictating against an interview in individual cases. In the latter circumstances, each such case should be called to the specific attention of the Bureau, together with the facts rendering an interview undesirable or impossible. Bureau authority must be procured for these interviews in accordance with Section 87C, 6b (7) (d) of the Manual of Instructions.

It is not desired that a project be undertaken to determine the cases falling into the above category. Offices having a relatively small number of Security Index subjects should, however, proceed to review their Security Index cases as circumstances permit. Larger offices should review the Security Index cases as they are reopened for the required annual investigative report or when the cases are processed in connection with the semiannual verification of residence and employment addresses. The New York Office should follow the latter procedure - i.e., review

its Security Index cases to determine the identities of subjects falling into the above category in connection with periodic verifications.

All offices are instructed to advise the Bureau by July 1, 1955, that the cases in which no subversive activities have been reported since January 1, 1949, have been identified and appropriate communications directed to the Bureau concerning interviews with these subjects in line with the preceding instructions herein.

1819

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memo. • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 1/7/55

TO :  
/ /

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX C

During the past week 64 cards were added to  
the Security Index and 15 cards were cancelled, a net  
increase of 49 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is  
26,552.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

1821

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office ~~Minneapolis~~ • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: January 13, 1955

FROM : SAC, Pittsburgh

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - COMSAB TABBING

Re SAC Letter No. 54-70 (K) dated 12-14-54.

Subsequent to a review of the files of all Security Index subjects tabbed COMSAB, all FD-122's necessary to delete the COMSAB tabbing from the Security Index cards of subjects, in accordance with instructions set out in relet, have been forwarded to the Bureau..

Office Memorandums • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: January 5,  
1955

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ of the Department called me on January 5, 1955, to advise that the Internal Security Division had received the Bureau's letter of December 20, 1954, to the Attorney General, setting forth the criteria or standards which the Bureau uses in determining dangerousness or potential dangerousness of an individual in connection with possible inclusion in the Security Index. Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ said that the Internal Security Division is studying these criteria. He said that the criteria as set forth in this memorandum to the Attorney General appear to be more complete than the criteria being used by the Department and, therefore, Departmental representatives will probably want to get together with us to discuss these criteria. I asked Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ whether there was any area of disagreement. He said none to his knowledge but Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ would like to discuss the criteria for the Department's clarification. Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ said the criteria which the Department has used are based on memoranda previously sent by the Bureau to the Department.

I told Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ that we are ready at any time to come over and discuss the criteria and at such time as he is ready, we will do so.

You will recall that we followed the Department for years in order to pin the Department down as to the Security Index standards. Finally, by memorandum dated October 8, 1952, the Department approved the standards we were using and specifically referred to Bureau memoranda relating to the standards dated September 16, 1949, and July 27, 1950. The Department, in their communication failed to mention the Bureau memorandum of June 28, 1951, in which we discussed the standards used by the Bureau in considerable detail, including our over-all concepts of the Emergency Detention Program. This oversight was called to the Department's attention and by memorandum dated November 25, 1952, the Department approved the Bureau's concepts of the Emergency Detention Program and the Security Index standards as outlined in the Bureau memorandum of June 28, 1951.

In our memorandum to the Attorney General dated December 23, 1954, we set forth the Security Index criteria and standards used by the Bureau, the data being taken directly from Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions. The standards submitted to the Attorney General are a compilation of the data furnished to the Department in previous memoranda and there has been no change in the basic criteria.

I believe we should hold a conference with Departmental officials to discuss all phases of the standards we are using and to answer any questions they may raise.

ACTION:

A conference will be held with Mr. [redacted] and Departmental representatives at such time as they are ready.

Mr. [redacted] is not  
able to attend  
[redacted]  
Division should do.

J.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

## EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date January 6, 1955To: Director, FBIFrom: SAField Office or Division Butte

SUGGESTION: That information presently typed on back of Security Index cards by the Field Office be typed instead on a separate card and securely attached to the Security Index card, e.g. stapled. When a new Security Index card is received for the same Subject, and no changes are necessary in the information going on the back of the card, the separate card can be removed from the old Security Index card and attached to the new Security Index card.

(P)

Its advantages are: The vast majority of SI changes are for employment and residence which are on the front of the card. The information on the back of the card which is added by the Field Office remains fairly constant. Above procedure will eliminate typing the same information over and over each time the Subject changes residence and/or employment. Savings to the Bureau will be the amount of salary equal to the amount of time it takes a typist to retype the information on the back of an SI card where no change is made in that information. In this connection those charged with maintaining the SI cards are usually employees in the higher pay grades. It should save at least \$                  annually. (Impossible for me to compute)

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

(Signature of Suggestor)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:  
It is believed that considerable savings on a Bureau-wide basis can be effected with the adoption of the above suggestion, consequently, a favorable recommendation is made that it be adopted.

1823

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date: 1/6/55

To: Director, FBI

From: SA

Division of assignment: BUTTE

SUGGESTION: That information presently typed on back of Security Index cards by the Field Office be typed instead on a separate card and securely attached to the Security Index card, e.g. stapled. When a new Security Index card is received for the same Subject, and no changes are necessary in the information going on the back of the card, the separate card can be removed from the old Security Index card and attached to the new Security Index card.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):

Advantages of suggestion: The vast majority of SI changes are for employment and residence which are on the front of the card. The information on the back of the card which is added by the Field Office remains fairly constant. Above procedure will eliminate typing the same information over and over each time the subject changes residence and/or employment. Savings to the Bureau will be the amount of salary equal to the amount of time it takes a typist to retype the information on the back of an SI card where no change is made in that information. In this connection Disadvantages of suggestion: those charged with maintaining the SI cards are usually employees in the higher pay grades.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

(Signature of suggestor)

Recommendations and comments of Division Head:  
It is believed that considerable savings on a Bureau-wide basis can be effected with the adoption of the above suggestion, consequently, favorable recommendation is made that it be adopted.

1824  
changed to  
1558

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (REGISTERED MAIL)

DATE: 1/14/55

FROM : SAC, SAN ANTONIO (

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -  
COMSAB TABLING

Re: SAC Letter 54-70 (K) dated 12/14/54.

All files of Security Index subjects tabbed for COMSAB in this office have been reviewed. FD-122 has been submitted in each case. If approved by the Bureau, there will be no COMSAB subjects in this office.

12-5

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, ATLANTA

SUBJECT: ✓ SECURITY INDEX  
ATLANTA DIVISION

DATE: JANUARY 17, 1955

REGISTERED MAIL

Re SAC Letter #47, dated 5-21-51.

The addresses and employment of all Security Index subjects has been verified in accordance with existing instructions, with the following exceptions:

Photographs are available on all Security Index subjects of the Atlanta Division.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: January 14,  
1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
BUFILE

The following is a report of the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on December 10, 1954.

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
December 11-17	113	10	103
December 18-24	46	13	33
December 25-31	37	7	30
January 1-7	64	15	49
January 8-14	66	21	45
	<u>326</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>260</u>

For your information, during the preceding four-week period 243 cards were added and 59 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 184 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,597.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: January 12, 1955

TO :

FROM : *CC: Director - G-6*

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

SYNOPSIS:

Each month we follow the field closely on the status of security work by analyzing the backlog of pending cases and delinquency in Espionage, Internal Security, Security Matter and foreign intelligence cases in classifications, and . Status of these cases as of December 31, 1954, is set forth herein.

Pending active matters in the entire field in the security classifications remained virtually unchanged, increasing slightly from 23,179 to 23,181. Delinquent matters decreased from 6,918 to 6,697, with the resultant over-all statistical decrease from 29.4 per cent to 28.8 per cent. The delinquency in security cases in the New York Office decreased substantially from 1,577 to 1,492, reducing delinquency from 29.3 to 26.4 per cent. The number of pending active matters in the classification increased in the New York Office from 4,021 to 4,117 and the delinquent items in this classification decreased from 1,323 to 1,232 or statistical delinquency of 29.9 per cent. It is noted that the 26.4 per cent of delinquency in the security classifications of the New York Office is the lowest percentage of delinquency in these classifications since the Bureau has, on a regular basis, been following the field in this matter.

Letters are being sent to 18 offices either instructing them to reduce their backlog and delinquency, or in some cases commenting upon their progress in bringing the security cases to current status.

RECOMMENDATION:

The field will continue to be followed closely in this matter and you will be advised of the results of the review of the January, 1955, administrative reports.

DETAILS:

Since December, 1951, we have been following, on a monthly basis, the twelve field offices having a large proportion of our pending security work and since March, 1952, all offices. We have written letters to the twelve offices and to other offices where progress in reducing the backlog of work and delinquency has not been satisfactory.

The December, 1952, administrative reports from all offices reflect that the total pending active matters in the classifications and increased by only two items this month from 23,179 to 23,181. The delinquent items decreased from 6,918 to 6,897, which represents a statistical decrease of from 29.4 per cent to 28.8 per cent.

The following statistics reflect the status of pending work including both pending active and pending inactive matters and delinquency for all field divisions as of December 31, 1951, and the progress for the last four months:

<u>Classification</u>	<u>TOTAL PENDING MATTERS CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 AND 105 ALL FIELD DIVISIONS</u>				
	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>9-30-54</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>
1,314	1,060	1,066	1,035	1,050	
32,812	21,807	21,911	22,419	22,075	
2,895	3,588	3,428	3,493	3,565	
Total	37,021	26,455	26,405	26,947	26,690

TOTAL DELINQUENT MATTERS  
CLASSIFICATIONS , AND  
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Classification</u>	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>9-30-54</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>
	525	172	163	170	136
	22,518	5,758	5,580	6,018	5,890-
	1,719	790	670	730	671
<b>Total</b>	<b>24,762</b>	<b>6,720</b>	<b>6,413</b>	<b>6,018</b>	<b>5,697</b>

The following statistics reflect the total of pending active matters, delinquency and percentage of delinquency of all offices since January 31, 1953.

CLASSIFICATIONS , AND  
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
1-31-53	24,098	11,772	48.8%
2-28-53	22,935	11,233	46.9%
3-31-53	23,033	10,890	47.3%
4-30-53	22,100	9,120	41.3%
5-31-53	21,740	9,730	44.8%
6-30-53	20,970	9,558	45.6%
7-31-53	20,180	9,411	46.6%
8-31-53	19,493	8,495	43.6%
9-30-53	19,224	7,571	39.4%
10-31-53	19,141	5,580	34.3%
11-30-53	19,833	6,655	33.5%
12-31-53	19,947	6,749	33.2%
1-31-54	20,520	7,494	36.5%
2-28-54	21,488	6,007	27.9%
3-31-54	21,848	6,617	30.2%
4-30-54	21,752	6,757	31.6%
5-31-54	21,863	7,822	35.8%
6-30-54	22,278	7,407	33.2%
7-31-54	22,977	7,163	31.6%
8-31-54	22,361	7,010	31.3%
9-30-54	23,011	6,720	29.1%
10-31-54	22,452	6,413	28.5%
11-31-54	23,179	6,918	29.7%
12-31-54	23,181	6,697	28.8%

Status of Security Work in Twelve of the  
Larger Offices

The following statistics reflect the progress of the twelve larger offices we have been closely following since December, 1951. These offices have approximately 80 per cent of the total Security Index cards and a high percentage of the pending work and delinquency in classification --, -- and --.

STATISTICS FOR TWELVE OFFICES  
SECURITY INDEX COUNT AND FOR  
AND MATTERS

<u>Office</u>	<u>Security Index Cards 12-15-54</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>		<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>	
		<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>
* New York	7,015	5,349	5,640	29.3%	26.4%
* Los Angeles	4,170	2,167	2,332	34.0%	32.0%
* San Francisco	2,338	1,886	1,814	39.0%	42.0%
* Chicago	1,544	1,454	1,416	50.0%	46.0%
* Detroit	1,356	943	965	20.0%	38.0%
Philadelphia	1,210	999	982	22.0%	24.0%
* Newark	900	1,140	1,130	37.0%	29.0%
Cleveland	684	489	492	28.0%	23.0%
* Boston	679	722	702	29.0%	28.0%
* Seattle	677	394	393	25.0%	27.0%
* New Haven	539	589	565	46.0%	30.0%
Minneapolis	525	280	301	21.0%	13.0%
	21,637	16,412	16,732		

\* Letters being sent to offices indicated. See page 8 herein.

The over-all statistics for the eleven offices other than the New York Office since August 31, 1952, are as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters</u>	<u>Percentage Delin- quent (%)</u>
8-31-52	12,611	7,589	60.2%
9-30-52	11,367	5,732	50.4%
10-31-52	11,286	4,957	43.9%
11-30-52	11,148	4,844	43.5%
12-31-52	10,937	4,578	41.9%
1-31-53	10,730	4,696	43.8%
2-28-53	10,721	4,358	40.6%
3-31-53	10,069	4,019	39.9%
4-30-53	9,411	2,887	30.7%
5-31-53	9,277	3,447	37.2%
6-30-53	8,964	3,532	39.4%
7-31-53	8,908	3,758	42.2%
8-31-53	8,547	3,618	42.3%
9-30-53	8,601	3,249	37.8%
10-31-53	8,845	2,785	31.4%
11-30-53	9,434	2,871	30.4%
12-31-53	9,552	3,261	34.1%
1-31-54	9,814	3,318	33.6%
2-28-54	10,288	3,021	29.4%
3-31-54	10,188	2,998	31.5%
4-30-54	10,201	3,209	39.8%
5-31-54	9,840	3,920	37.5%
6-30-54	8,839	3,679	32.4%
7-31-54	10,317	3,348	33.4%
8-31-54	10,048	3,364	32.7%
9-30-54	10,669	3,488	31.9%
10-31-54	10,557	3,376	34.5%
11-31-54	11,063	3,822	33.6%
12-31-54	11,092	3,728	

New York Office

During 1953, the New York Office made a steady reduction in delinquent matters in the security classifications as well as a steady reduction in the case backlog. During November, 1953, the security delinquency dropped below 50 per cent for the first time in 1953 to 47 per cent. This was reduced even further in December to 43 per cent as compared with January, 1953, delinquency of 76 per cent in the security classifications. In January, 1954, the New York delinquency stood at 53 per cent. It was reduced, however, in February, 1954, to 32 per cent and during the period March through September, 1954, averaged 38 per cent. In October, 1954, the New York security delinquency dropped

to 30.9 per cent and on November 30, 1954, to 29.3 per cent, the figure in each successive instance representing the lowest percentage of delinquency in the security classifications which had existed in the New York Office since this matter has been followed on a regular basis by the Bureau.

The December, 1954, administrative report of New York reveals still further progress. Its security delinquency decreased during the past month from 29.3 per cent to 26.4 per cent, a new low for that office. Although pending active security cases increased somewhat in the New York Office from 5,840 for November, 1954, to 5,840 for December, 1954, delinquent items decreased from 1,577 as of November, 1954, to 1,492 as of December, 1954.

The New York Office has approximately 24 per cent of the pending active matters in the and classifications in the entire field. This office also has approximately 22 per cent of the number of delinquent items in these classifications throughout the field. The average delinquency in all other offices at the end of November, 1954, was approximately 29.7 per cent. The New York delinquency was 26.4 per cent as previously noted.

The bulk of the New York backlog and delinquency is in the classification. During December, 1954, the number of pending active matters in the classification in the New York Office increased from 4,021 to 4,117. The number of delinquent matters in this classification decreased from 1,323 to 1,232 with a statistical decrease from 32.9 per cent for November, 1954, to 29.9 per cent as of December 31, 1954.

#### Status of Security Work in the Remaining Forty Offices

The remaining forty offices are listed according to the percentage of delinquency on December 31, 1954, in total matters in classifications and . These statistics reflect the progress during December, 1954. It should be noted that many of the smaller offices have no pending matters in classifications and their entire pending backlog is in classification - matters.

<u>Office</u>	<u>Active Matters</u>		<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>	
	<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>
* Albany	340	363	28%	44%
* Little Rock	37	31	16%	42%
* Milwaukee	269	269	20%	33%
* Dallas	92	82	12%	30%
* Baltimore	690	632	28.8%	27%
* Charlotte	110	113	25%	27%
* El Paso	43	41	20%	27%
* Norfolk	51	66	22%	27%
Indianapolis	168	172	18%	25%
Knoxville	40	35	20%	25%
Oklahoma City	51	42	18%	25%
Salt Lake City	59	70	22%	24%
Buffalo	824	578	8%	23%
Denver	187	211	15%	22%
Washington Field	947	922	24%	22%
* Louisville	51	52	41%	21%
Pittsburgh	367	326	29%	21%
Savannah	34	28	6%	21%
St. Louis	289	276	24%	20%
Atlanta	76	91	21%	20%
Cincinnati	360	373	35%	20%
Kansas City	103	89	20%	20%
Miami	195	202	22%	20%
Phoenix	72	78	12%	19%
Houston	62	68	21%	17%
Mobile	45	52	20%	17%
New Orleans	138	145	28%	16%
Birmingham	38	35	37%	15%
San Diego	220	205	32%	15%
San Juan	156	149	22%	14%
San Antonio	53	51	26%	12%
Anchorage	32	34	19%	11%
Memphis	45	35	29%	11%
Richmond	87	96	21%	11%
Portland	111	127	8%	10%
Butte	61	56	16%	9%
Honolulu	34	34	14%	9%
Omaha	60	58	27%	9%
Springfield	93	104	29%	9%
Albuquerque	77	58	9%	7%

\* Letters sent to offices indicated regarding delinquent status.  
See page 8 herein.

The following figures illustrate the progress of the forty offices as a whole since June 30, 1952, as reflected in the administrative reports.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Letters</u> ( )	<u>Delinquent Letters</u> ( )	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
6-30-52	8,417	3,842	45.6%
7-31-52	7,778	3,156	40.6%
8-31-52	6,928	3,054	44.0%
9-30-52	6,198	2,109	34.0%
10-31-52	6,126	1,279	20.8%
11-30-52	6,129	1,703	27.8%
12-31-52	6,228	1,691	27.2%
1-31-53	6,080	1,554	25.6%
2-28-53	6,103	1,515	24.6%
3-31-53	5,936	1,542	26.0%
4-30-53	5,864	1,414	24.1%
5-31-53	4,897	1,726	29.3%
6-30-53	5,611	1,577	28.1%
7-31-53	5,146	1,358	26.4%
8-31-53	5,095	1,323	26.0%
9-30-53	5,050	1,219	24.1%
10-31-53	4,987	1,087	21.8%
11-30-53	5,180	1,355	26.1%
12-31-53	5,260	1,301	24.6%
1-31-54	5,562	1,444	25.9%
2-28-54	5,997	1,347	22.5%
3-31-54	6,079	1,431	23.5%
4-30-54	6,174	1,327	21.5%
5-31-54	6,733	1,710	25.4%
6-30-54	7,022	1,522	21.6%
7-31-54	6,910	1,590	23.0%
8-31-54	6,728	1,520	22.5%
9-30-54	6,710	1,410	21.0%
10-31-54	6,594	1,398	21.2%
11-30-54	6,767	1,519	22.4%
12-31-54	6,449	1,477	22.4%

#### Letters to the Field

As noted previously, on page one herein, we are sending letters to 18 offices either instructing them to take appropriate measures to bring the investigations in the security classifications to, or maintain them in a current status. Letters are being directed to the offices indicated by asterisks on pages four and seven herein. It will be noted that the security delinquency of those offices for the month of December, 1954, appears in the extreme right hand column of the two lists on pages four and seven.

UNRECORDED  
1-18-55

1-18-55  
SAC LETTER - ATTACHMENT

(I) MISTAKEN IDENTITIES - SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -- Your attention is specifically directed to Section D, SAC Letter Number 121, Series 52, dated November 13, 1952. Therein is pointed out the necessity of avoiding submission of reports containing erroneous identifications. I wish to repeat at this time the imperative obligation of all employees to be sure that all activity attributed to the subjects of investigations does, in fact, pertain to the individuals under investigation. Several instances have been noted recently wherein activities of individuals with names similar to those of subjects under investigation were incorrectly attributed to the persons under investigation. In each instance addresses were available for these persons and had appropriate background investigation been conducted the errors would have been avoided. Investigative conclusions must be based on facts rather than unsupported assumptions if we are to maintain our standards of investigative accuracy. At your next conference of security Agents you should bring this matter forcefully to the attention of all Agent personnel.

1823

c - Mr. ██████████  
cc - Mr. ██████████  
cc - Mr. ██████████

list  
Assistant Attorney General

January 19, 1955.

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX LIST

General

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of the individuals maintained in the Security Index. Names included in the main portion of the list are arranged alphabetically. The names of individuals coming within five designated groups are listed on separate pages. Following each name is information reflecting the race, sex, birth date, Bureau file number and the Bureau field office covering the residence of the individual.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment (1)

Note on Yellow Onus:  
Espionage Section of the Special Section not included. The five designated groups are:

Foreign Government Employees  
United Nations Employees  
Pro-Tito Yugoslavia  
U. S. Government Employees  
Atomic Energy Program Employees

WGO:mjt  
(6)

Personally delivered to  
DELIVERED TO OFFICE  
MR. TOMPKINS  
1/20/55 [initials]

EX-110

RECORDED-A1 13 JAN 22 1955

SEARCHED INDEXED  
SERIALIZED FILED

1823

(6)  
JAN 20 1955  
[initials]

1829

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 1/21/55

FROM :

SUBJECT:

*During the past week 52 cards were added to  
the Security Index and 9 cards were cancelled, a net  
increase of 43 cards.*

*The Security Index count as of today is  
26,640.*

ACTION:

*None. This is for your information.*

## Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. [Signature]

DATE: 1/19/55

FROM : MR. [Signature]

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX LIST [Signature]

The Security Index list as of January 14, 1955, has been prepared. One copy is attached herewith for transmittal to the SAC, Quantico, for retention in his personal custody with the other vital records maintained at the FBI Academy.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That this memorandum and attached list be forwarded to the SAC, Quantico, marked Personal and Confidential, Registered, Return Receipt Requested.
2. That upon receipt, the SAC, Quantico, place the attached list with the other vital records maintained at Quantico, personally destroy by burning the old Security Index list in his possession and note hereon that such action has been taken.
3. That thereafter, this memorandum be returned to the Bureau, marked for my attention.

Attachment (1) RECORDED 32

WGO:mjt

(6)

cc - Mr. [Signature]  
 cc - Mr. [Signature]  
 cc - Mr. [Signature]  
 cc - SAC, Quantico  
 cc - Mr. [Signature]

JAN 22 1955

600

600 JAH:mt

UNF-CH-10  
1-26-55

January 26, 1955

PROPOSED CHANGE IN  
SECTION 87C  
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

The sentence under (3) (A) on page 231 of Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions should be amended in its entirety to read:

- (A) Any individual known to be currently engaged in espionage activities.

1837

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ]

DATE: 1/28/55

FROM : ]

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - C-4

During the past week 37 cards were added to the Security Index and 19 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 18 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,658.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Assistant Attorney General

January 27, 1955

Director, FBI

**PROGRAM FOR IDENTIFICATION AND DELEGATION  
OF PERSONS COMMITTED POTENTIALLY  
DANGEROUS TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND  
PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES**

**Security Index**

Reference is made to my memorandum to the Attorney General dated December 23, 1954, relating to the general criteria or standards utilized in determining whether or not names should be included on the list of persons to be considered for apprehension in an emergency under the above-captioned program.

Pursuant to the request of Mr. [redacted] of your Division, a conference was held on January 24, 1955, between representatives of the Department and this Bureau at which time a general discussion was held on the Security Index criteria or standards. The conference ascertained that there was no area of disagreement between the Department and this Bureau on the criteria or concepts regarding dangerousness. It was recognized that there are varying degrees of revolutionary dispositions and subversive activities and that the criteria or standards listed in my memorandum of December 23, 1954, are not all-inclusive but are used as guides in determining whether there are reasonable grounds suggested by investigation for considering a person dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country at the time of an emergency.

During the discussion of the criteria it was felt that consideration should be given to rephrasing item A as listed in my memorandum of December 23, 1954, for the purpose of clarification. Item A in that communication reads as follows: "Any subject of a current espionage investigation."

The matter has been considered and item A in the criteria used by this Bureau is being amended to read as follows: "Any individual known to be currently engaged in espionage activities."

1

1832

This change merely clarifies the point and  
in no way affects names already on the Security Index  
by reason of such activities since in every instance  
of this type name will be removed from the Security  
Index until the engagement in current espionage  
activity has been established by investigation.

You will be promptly advised of any  
consideration given in the future to changing the  
Security Index criteria.

~~STANFORD FORM NO. 64~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 1/26/55

TO :

FROM : *[Signature]*SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
Bufile

In my memorandum to you dated 1/5/55, I advised that Mr. [redacted] of the Department had contacted me in connection with the Bureau's letter of 12/23/54 to the Attorney General, setting forth the criteria or standards which the Bureau uses in determining dangerousness or potential dangerousness of an individual in connection with possible inclusion in the Security Index. At that time Mr. [redacted] said that the Internal Security Division was studying these criteria and that there appeared to be no area of disagreement with the Department's criteria but that after further study he would like to discuss the criteria with Bureau representatives for the purpose of clarification.

I recommended that a conference be held with Mr. [redacted] and Department representatives at such time as they were ready. The Director approved the recommendation and commented that it is not up to us to advise what his division should do. v

On 1/24/55, Supervisor [redacted] and I met with Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted], of the Department's Internal Security Division. Mr. [redacted] stated that they had carefully reviewed the Security Index criteria as listed in the Bureau's letter to the Attorney General dated 12/23/54, and that there was no area of disagreement between the Bureau's criteria and the criteria used by the Department. Mr. [redacted] concurred.

[redacted] I pointed out that the criteria as listed in the 12/23/54 letter to the Attorney General were taken directly from our Manual of Instructions to field offices and were in sufficient detail to afford assistance to our field personnel in evaluating cases and recommending cases for the Security Index. Mr. [redacted] stated he intended to recommend that the Department adopt a criteria exactly as set out in the referenced letter and requested to be advised at any time amendments or changes to the criteria are being considered. I told him that we would see that the Department is so advised.

Mr. [redacted] suggested that we might wish to consider rewording item A in the criteria for the purpose of clarification. It reads: "Any subject of a current espionage investigation." I told him we would be glad to consider the point. I explained to him that in every instance of that type names have not been added to the Security Index until engagement in current espionage activity has been established by investigation.

Both Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted] understand that there are varying degrees of revolutionary dispositions and subversive activities and that the Security Index criteria or standards are not all-inclusive but are used as guides to assist in determining whether there are reasonable grounds suggested by investigation for considering a person dangerous or potentially dangerous.

It is recommended that item A in the criteria be changed to read as follows: "Any individual known to be currently engaged in espionage activities." This merely clarifies the point and in no way affects existing Security Index cards.

ACTION:

If you approve there is attached a letter to Mr. [redacted] and a Manual change. An SAC Letter is not necessary on this change since there is no change in policy.

GHH.

Z

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVER

TO :

DATE: 1/21/55

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS

C  
The Security Index has cards for 26,597 persons as of January 14, 1955. This is a net increase of 229 or .9% over last month. Of the total, 24,758 or 93.1% are communists.

A detailed table is attached in duplicate. The table shows as of January 14, 1955, the distribution of the subjects by field office, nationalistic tendencies, dangerousness, sex, race, and citizenship. Also the number on "special lists" are shown. A key to abbreviations is attached.

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS USED IN SECURITY INDEX

AL	Alien
CS	Comsab
DC	Detcom
KF	Key Figure
NA	Naturalized
NB	Native Born
TF	Top Functionary
UN	Unknown
AEP	Atomic Energy Program Employees
BUL	Bulgarian
COM	Communist Party, USA
ESP	Espionage Subjects
FGE	Foreign Government Employees
GOV	United States Government Employees
HUN	Hungarian
ISL	Independent Socialist League
JFG	Johnson Forest Group
MCI	Muslim Cult of Islam
MIS	Miscellaneous
NPR	Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
PPA	Proletarian Party of America
RUS	Russian
SUA	Socialist Union of America
SWP	Socialist Workers' Party
UNE	United Nations Employees
UPR	Union of the People for the Establishment of the Republic of Puerto Rico
YUG	Yugoslavian

Enc 1

205

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

212

DATE: January 31  
1955

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX  
Bufile

Pursuant to the recommendations contained in the memorandum from the Executives' Conference to the Director dated January 25, 1955, captioned "Security Index," a proposed SAC Letter and appropriate Manual changes have been prepared. The Executives' Conference memorandum is attached.

ACTION:

The proposed SAC Letter and Manual changes are attached for approval.

For the information of the Training and Inspection Division, the SAC Letter should be prepared and sent to the field immediately due to the urgency of this matter.

2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

January 31, 1955

**PROPOSED CHURCH  
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS  
SECTION 87C**

Quality Dept. - S. A.

**Page 28 b -** Following the heading "(1) Purpose," under "B. Security Index," the third paragraph should be amended to read as follows:

"No action shall be taken against any individuals included in the Security Index except upon authorization of warrants for arrest or authorization for other action against such individuals by the Attorney General.

Page 29 - Insert the following as a separate paragraph immediately after the heading "(2) Determination of Dangerousness of an Individual:"

"The following is a list of factors which will be of assistance in determining the effectiveness of a program. \_\_\_\_\_

**Page 29 b - Insert the following as a separate paragraph immediately after the heading "(4) recommendations for, and preparation of Security Index cards:**

1-20-57

Page 32 & - At top of page, immediately after caption "Cancellation and removal of cards from the active Security Index," insert the following as a separate paragraph:

"The Special Agent in Charge shall occasionally  
recommend the cancellation of security index  
cards by writing under the cancellation slip as  
in section 470.10, (a) herein."



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

PERSONAL ATTENTION  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
SAC LEXINGTON, KY-6

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 2, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- Due to the present grave and tense international situation I am deeply concerned over our Security Index Program which in time of national emergency represents the Nation's most powerful weapon in combating espionage, sabotage and insurrection by preventing dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals from remaining at liberty.

I want you to know that the Attorney General has advised me that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases but that in an emergency he will direct that all persons whose names are then included in the Security Index be promptly apprehended. Therefore, the Bureau for all intents and purposes is responsible for the listing of all names included in the Security Index and for the arrests which will follow at the time of an emergency. We must be certain at all times that the listing of every name in the Security Index is supported and justified by sufficient information concerning subversive activities or revolutionary tendencies developed during thorough investigations to establish grounds for detention in the event of a national crisis.


The failure to have the names of all dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals in the Security Index at the time of an emergency means we have not fulfilled our responsibilities in the security field and we will not be in a position to prevent sabotage, espionage, sedition, insurrection and strikes or slowdowns directed by subversive elements. On the other hand it is essential that only dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals are listed for apprehension in an emergency.

In that connection I want to emphasize to you again the absolute necessity for bringing all pending security cases to a logical conclusion where investigation remains to be conducted before a determination can be made regarding inclusion in the Security Index.

In view of the importance of this matter I am holding each Special Agent in Charge personally responsible for each Security Index listing in his office to be certain that each listing is based on sound grounds.

The following instructions shall be placed into effect immediately:

/



UNCLASSIFIED

2-2-55

1. Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally recommend the inclusion of each name for the Security Index and the removal of any name from the Security Index, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the recommendations must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

2. An immediate review of the case file on each individual whose name is presently included in the Security Index shall be made at this time. Although the recommendations for inclusion of the names that are in the Security Index at this time have emanated from your office in most instances and under present requirements these cases are reviewed in connection with the preparation of annual supplemental investigative reports during which reviews you have been specifically instructed to evaluate each case to be certain the Security Index card is warranted, I am initiating this comprehensive review at this time to make absolutely certain that all factors in every case have been thoroughly considered by you to determine if the cases remain sound.

Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally approve or disapprove the retention of the names of all subjects in the Security Index at this time, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the approvals or disapprovals must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor. The approval or disapproval shall be submitted to the Bureau in an individual memorandum for each Security Index case. Each memorandum shall be submitted under the title of the individual case and shall reference this SAC Letter. Each memorandum must set forth the reasons why the subject should be retained in or removed from the Security Index in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your decision.

The reviews must be completed within 60 days from the receipt of this communication by all offices having less than 1,000 Security Index cases. All the remaining offices must complete the reviews within 90 days from the receipt of this letter with the exception of the New York Office where the reviews must be completed within 6 months.

For your information the following offices have more than 1,000 names on the Security Index at this time: Chicago, Detroit,

2/2/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-8

- 2 -

Urgent

2-1-57

Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco. In connection with the above instructions both as to adding names to or deleting names from the Security Index and the review of all Security Index cases the Bureau is making the exception in offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects because of the volume of work in those offices. The Bureau instructs that the reviews and recommendations in these matters in such offices be shared proportionately by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge and Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

Each Special Agent in Charge must keep an accurate record of the progress of the reviews. An airtel must be submitted to the Bureau each Friday after the receipt of this communication until the project is completed setting forth: (1) the total number of cases to be reviewed during this project and (2) the number of cases in which the required data has been forwarded to the Bureau. Each airtel is to be captioned "Security Index Review."

1826

*Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 2/4/55

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX *Secular*

During the past week 56 cards were added to the Security Index and 9 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 47 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,705.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : *S* SAC, PORTLAND  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX; - *C 17*  
COMSAB TABLING  
PORTLAND DIVISION

DATE: 2-7-55

Re SAC letter 54-70 dated 12/14/54, paragraph (X)  
captioned "SECURITY INDEX - COMSAB TABLING".

In consonance with Bureau instructions, the files of  
all Security Index subjects tabbed Comsab have been personally  
reviewed by me and the appropriate adjustments have been made.

As of possible interest, on receipt of referenced  
SAC letter, this office had a total of 67 Security Index subjects  
tabbed for Comsab. Upon the completion of the review, we now have  
23 Security Index subjects tabbed Comsab; or, a reduction of 44  
such tabbings. Work list is being retained in instant file with  
copy of this letter.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: Feb. 2, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -

In accordance with the Director's instructions there is attached an air-tel to all offices instructing that the residence and business addresses of all Detcom and Comsab subjects in the Security Index be immediately verified with the exception of those that have been checked out within the past 90 days. (The Detcom and Comsab classifications include all Security Index subjects who are considered exceedingly dangerous who should be apprehended prior to others in the Security Index.) Total as of 1-17-55 10,820

All offices will advise the Bureau by air-tel February 11, 1955, that the checks have been made. Any office which is unable to complete the work by February 11, 1955, will advise by air-tel the number they have been able to verify and the number remaining to be checked out.

The offices will also list the names of those Detcom and Comsab subjects who cannot be located together with the date the last known address was verified.

The original of the above air-tel is on Plastiplate and is being retained in Room 1503. It may be procured for initialing by calling Mr. [redacted] on extension 2355.

1037

FEBRUARY 3, 1955

TO: ALL CAC's

SECURITY INDEX. THE DIRECTOR WANTS TO BE ASSURED THAT THE  
CITY AND ADDRESSES OF ALL SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS PAGED  
DURING OR COMING AS OF JANUARY 1, 1955, YOU SHOULD  
**IMMEDIATELY CHECK CURRENT RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES**  
OF ALL SUCH SUBJECTS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED WITHIN  
90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION. THIS PROJECT  
MUST BE COMPLETED, IF POSSIBLE, BY FEBRUARY 17, 1955.  
LET ME TELL ALL OFFICES WHICH HAVE COMPLETED THE CHECK  
MUST SUBMIT AN AIR-TEL OR ADVISORY AND LISTING THE NAME  
OF EACH SUBJECT WHO CANNOT BE LOCATED TOGETHER WITH THE  
DATE THE LAST KNOWN ADDRESS WAS VERIFIED. ANY OFFICES  
WHICH ARE UNABLE TO COMPLETE THIS CHECK BY FEBRUARY 17,  
1955, MUST ADVISE BY AIR-TEL ON THAT DATE THE NUMBER OF  
DIVISION OR COLONIAL ESTABLISHMENTS WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED AND  
THE NUMBER REMAINING TO BE CHECKED. THIS DATA WILL BE  
GIVEN YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION AND THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS MUST  
BE ADHERED TO STRICTLY. CONTINUOUS INVESTIGATIVE ATTENTION  
UNDER YOUR PERSONAL DIRECTION MUST BE GIVEN TO THOSE RECCOMENDATIONS  
ON COMSAB SUBJECTS LEAD ADDRESS CANNOT BE VERIFIED  
DURING THIS CHECK.

1840

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. FEBRUARY 9, 1955      RADICORAL

Transmit the following message to: SAC, SAN DIEGO  
ATTENTION: INSPECTOR

*G. T. F.*  
SECURITY INDEX. RE TELEPHONE CALL FROM INSPECTOR  
TO BUREAU FEBRUARY EIGHT LAST. INSPECTOR'S WRITE-UPS WITH  
SAC's COMMENTS REGARDING APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF SECURITY  
INDEX CASES IS SATISFACTORY IN COMPLIANCE WITH SAC LETTER  
NUMBER FIFTY FIVE DASH EIGHT PROVIDING SAC HAS PERSONALLY  
REVIEWED EACH CASE FILE AND REASONS FOR RETAINING IN OR  
REMOVING FROM SECURITY INDEX ARE SET OUT IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL  
TO CLEARLY REFLCT THE SOUNDNESS OF DECISION. EACH  
RECOMMENDATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED IN INDIVIDUAL CASE BY  
COVER MEMORANDUM. RE SAC RECOMMENDING CANCELLATION OF  
EXISTING SECURITY INDEX CARD. SITUATION SHOULD BE HANDLED  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS THAT PRIOR TO  
CANCELLATION THE SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR INTERVIEW  
UNLESS REASONS ARE FURNISHED BUREAU WHY INTERVIEW IS INADVISABLE  
OR IMPOSSIBLE. NO INTERVIEW SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT  
PRIOR BUREAU AUTHORITY.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 10,  
1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF SECURITY INDEX

SAC spoke to me on February 9 regarding the review being made of the Security Index cases in the field. He advised that there are some problem cases and he wondered whether the Bureau was in any way changing its standards for persons to be included in the Index.

I advised him that the standards have not been changed as of this time, that the Bureau recognizes there are some borderline cases and we are going over some of them to see whether any changes should be made. However, at this time there is no change and the review desired is exactly in accordance with the SAC Letter which calls for the review. I told him that the Bureau is considering, and will probably adopt, a change in our DETCOM procedures whereby those persons tabbed for prior apprehension will be restricted to individuals on whom a strong case can be made showing immediate potential danger of espionage, sabotage, or disruption in the event of an emergency.

I told him that instructions would be coming out to the field on this I thought within a few days and that his review of the cases should take this into account.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 9,  
1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
FBI File

By reference from Mr. [redacted] office I talked with Inspector [redacted] at San Diego at 3:50 P.M. on February 6, 1955, regarding certain Security Index matters. Mr. [redacted] advised that during the inspection tour conducted at San Diego, the Inspectors were reviewing all Security Index cases and preparing individual write-ups for each case leading into the sufficiency of the Security Index listing.

Inspector [redacted] stated that the SAC will be requested to comment in each case regarding the Inspector's recommendations in the matter. He inquired as to whether a copy of the Inspector's write-up and the SAC's comments submitted to the Bureau by cover memorandum in each case would be sufficient to answer the requirements set out in SAC Letter Number 55-8, dated February 2, 1955. That SAC letter required a memorandum from the SAC for each Security Index case advising whether the SAC approved or disapproved the Security Index listing.

Inspector [redacted] stated that in certain cases he was recommending reinterviews or interviews be conducted prior to a final decision concerning retention or cancellation of Security Index cards.

Inspector [redacted] inquired as to the procedure to be followed in connection with the review of all Security Index cases as outlined in SAC Letter Number 55-8 which in part states that each SAC shall personally approve or disapprove the retention of names presently in the Security Index. He inquired as to whether the SAC should request Bureau authority to interview a Security Index subject prior to recommending the removal from the Security Index as is required under existing instructions in Section C7C of the Manual of Instructions or whether the removal should be recommended without a request to interview.

Inspector [redacted] requested to be advised concerning the questions raised by radiogram.

/

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) It is recommended that Inspector be advised that the Inspector's write-up in each Security Index case along with the SAC's comments will be sufficient to answer the requirements as set out in SAC Letter Number 55-8 providing the SAC has personally reviewed the individual case file and each write-up sets forth the reasons why the subject should be retained in or removed from the Security Index in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of the decision.
- (2) It is recommended that Inspector be advised that prior to recommending the cancellation of an existing Security Index card the SAC should consider requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject or furnish a satisfactory reason to the Bureau reflecting that such an interview is inadvisable or impossible in accordance with existing instructions in Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions.
- (3) If you approve, there is attached a radiogram to the SAC at San Diego, marked for the attention of Inspector advising him in accordance with the above recommendations.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: February 9, 1955

TO :

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - General

The Executives' Conference on February 8, 1955,  
consisting of Messrs.

considered problems  
affecting the Security Index including the concept of dividing the  
Index into two categories; the first group tabbed for priority  
apprehensions in the event of a limited but grave emergency and the  
second group to be arrested in the event of an all-out emergency.

## BACKGROUND:

As of February 4, 1955, we had listed on the Security Index  
for detention, in the event the Attorney General's Emergency Detention  
Program goes into effect, a total of 26,705 individuals. Of these,  
10,820 (as of January 14, 1955) were listed for priority apprehension  
based on leadership in subversive organizations such as the Communist  
Party, Socialist Workers Party, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico,  
et cetera; past training in espionage or sabotage; information  
reflecting past or current activities indicating that the individual  
may be violent; or persons on the Security Index employed in or  
having access to Key Facilities.

The extent and type of activities of the individuals on the  
Security Index varies and consequently the potential dangerousness of  
these individuals varies accordingly. In the event of a limited but  
grave emergency, such as war with Soviet Russia wherein the fighting  
took place outside the continental limits of the United States, it is  
suggested that apprehensions under the Emergency Detention Program  
be limited to those persons having a strong potential for espionage,  
sabotage, or disruptive activities, leaving the remainder of the  
Security Index for apprehension in the event the emergency assumes  
such proportions that the security of the nation demands extension  
of the arrests to all persons potentially dangerous to the country.  
This latter situation will exist in the event of imminent invasion  
or attack on the continental United States itself.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR.

In order to implement this concept of the Emergency Detention Program it will be necessary to change our priority classification in the Security Index to include only those individuals who would clearly constitute an immediate and strong danger to the country as potential saboteurs, espionage agents, and disruptionists. This group would be confined to the following, all of whom could be shown to be engaged in strong subversive activities, current or during the recent past:

- 1) All top functionaries and key figures (These are the leaders of subversive organizations who implement and carry out the policy of the organizations.)
- 2) Currently active Communists (active within the past year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or more of the following:
  - (a) local organizers or leaders;
  - (b) special training at the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow; (These were special Marxist-Leninist schools held in Russia for picked individuals.)
  - (c) experience as picket captains, strong-arm men, or active participation in violent strikes, riots, or demonstrations;
  - (d) persons who have made violent statements or who are known to have strong revolutionary tendencies as evidenced by their activities.
- 3) Persons active in the Communist Party underground;
- 4) Any other individual whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary group, clearly and unmistakably depict that he is a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in the event of an emergency.

In each of the above categories the individual case will stand on its own merits. It is estimated that this group tabbed for priority apprehension will be less than 5000.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The remainder of the individuals on the Security Index will be listed for apprehension in the event of an all-out emergency wherein the country is faced with the necessity of taking complete security measures. Each of these individuals will, nevertheless, present a potential danger to the security of this country and there will be a calculated risk in holding up his apprehension at the time of an emergency which would require the apprehension of the priority group. There are, however, certain definite advantages to this procedure, such as:

1) The Bureau would concentrate immediately on those individuals labelled most dangerous during the first few days of an emergency.

2) In the event the war or emergency did not develop to the point of actual invasion or devastation of the United States itself, the normal police controls may be sufficient to control the activities of the remaining individuals on the Security Index. It is a fundamental principle that the liberties of citizens should not be infringed upon unless absolutely necessary and thus, unless arrests are absolutely necessary of all persons on the Index, this procedure should be avoided. The Bureau would be showing its continued observance of respecting the rights of individual citizens to the greatest extent possible consistent with the security of the nation and would thus avoid criticism for stern restrictions subject to criticism at a later date.

3) It is felt that under this procedure the Bureau would be in a position to answer possible criticism in the future by pointing out that it sought to avoid apprehensions of the full Security Index until the overriding considerations of security based on the all-out emergency demanded that this be done.

We should take cognizance of certain disadvantages to this procedure:

1) As all persons on the Security Index are considered potentially dangerous, there is a risk that those individuals not arrested, if arrests are restricted to a priority group, will commit acts of sabotage, espionage, et cetera, detrimental to the security of the country.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR.

2) If the apprehensions are restricted to a priority group, the remaining subjects are very likely to flee or go into hiding, making their ultimate arrest, if necessary, most difficult.

3) The subjects who will be tabbed for priority apprehension are, to a large extent, subjects who will be most difficult to locate in the event of an emergency. Many of them are in the underground now or at least have experience in underground activities. Therefore, our percentage of apprehensions in this group will logically be smaller than it would be in the over-all group.

If this breakdown for priority apprehension is put into effect, the field should be advised immediately in order that the field may include in its current review of Security Index subjects a recommendation as to those persons who should be included for priority apprehension.

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that the above procedure be put into effect at once; that is, the Security Index be split into two groups; one designated for apprehension in a limited but grave emergency short of actual invasion or imminent attack on the continental United States, and the other listed for apprehension in the event of all-out emergency which would require this country to put into effect the most stringent security measures for self-preservation purposes.

If you agree, an SAC Letter implementing this is attached.

OK. Read this and be careful  
screening of all cases to go  
on either listing.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: January 25,  
1955

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX - G-1.

On January 25, 1955, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs.

certain problems raised by Mr. , considered in connection with the Security Index.

(1) The Manual of Instructions, Volume III, Section 87C, page 28b, where the purpose of the Security Index is set forth, states in part "In preparing and maintaining the Security Index, the Bureau is acting only in the capacity of assembling the facts concerning the individuals involved for referral to the appropriate officials of the Department of Justice for their consideration and decision as to action to be taken at a time of national emergency."

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

That inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised the Bureau that he does not have the funds or the manpower to review cases on the Security Index, to all practical effects, the decision rests with the FBI as to who will be apprehended in an emergency. Therefore, the above phraseology should be changed to read as follows: "However, in preparing and maintaining the Security Index, to all practical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to those persons who will be apprehended in the event of an emergency, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised the Bureau that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases."

(2) Section 87C (2) lists a number of factors which should be considered in assisting in a determination as to an individual's potential dangerousness. Among these factors Mr. felt that the following were very weak: subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization; contributions to or collection of funds for the organization; and refusal to furnish information or to testify regarding membership or activities in a subversive movement.

RECORDED-61

In the instructions following the listing of these and other factors, the Manual states "It is not intended

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

"that an individual shall be deemed dangerous merely because one or more of the foregoing factors are applicable in his case. However, these factors should be considered as indicating loyalty to a subversive organization, thereby assisting in determination of the dangerousness or potential dangerousness of an individual subject and whether he should be included in the Security Index under the standards set forth below." Thereafter the standards utilized by the Bureau for consideration for inclusion in the Security Index are set forth in detail. Mr. Tolson felt that the Manual should more clearly state that the factors listed in Section 87C (2), and particularly the three factors set forth above, do not of themselves constitute a basis for inclusion in the Security Index.

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

That following the title under Section 87C (2), "Determination of Dangerousness of an Individual," the following be set forth in order that these factors will not be confused with the standards under which we place persons on the Security Index: "The following is a list of factors which will be of assistance in determining the dangerousness of an individual. ~~However, they~~ are not to be considered as standards for placing on the Security Index, as such standards are listed in Section 87C (3)."

(3) At the present time although by SAC Letters the field has been instructed that the SAC is responsible for proper investigation and evaluation of Security Index cases, there is no specific requirement that the SAC shall personally review and approve the recommendation that a person be included in the Security Index. Further, while there is a requirement that cases be brought up to date, analyzed and evaluated, at least annually, by the submission of a field report (except in the case of the Bureau Office), there is no specific requirement for a renewed recommendation from the field at any time for the continuance of the subject on the Security Index.

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

That an SAC Letter be sent to the field, cautioning the field as to the seriousness of inclusions of names of persons on the Security Index and pointing out that the Bureau is, in effect, making the decisions for arrests, since the

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Department of Justice has not and apparently will not arrange for attorneys to review and approve such inclusions. Also, that this SAC Letter make it the personal responsibility of the SAC to make recommendations to include or cancel subjects for the Security Index, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instance the recommendations must be made by the SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor. (This would include Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco.)

This SAC Letter will further require that an immediate review be made by the field of all cases on the Security Index at this time and that the SACs (except as indicated in the above six offices) personally approve or disapprove the retention of the present subjects in the Security Index, this approval or disapproval to be set forth in individual memoranda on each case to the Bureau setting forth the reasons why the subject should be retained in or removed from the Security Index.

The Executives' Conference recommended that this review be completed within sixty days by all offices having less than 1,000 cases; all the remaining offices within 90 days, with the exception of New York which will have a deadline of six months.

If you agree with the above, an appropriate SAC Letter will be prepared.

(4) Relative to approval of cases for inclusion in the Security Index, the present system is that the individual Supervisor handling the substantive case reviews the file and either approves or disapproves recommendations from the field as to inclusion of a subject in the Security Index. The recommendations of the individual Supervisors then flow through one experienced Supervisor who likewise reviews the file and makes his recommendation. If there is any disagreement at this point, or if there is not a clear showing as to the action to be taken, the case is referred to Section Chief Baumgardner, and if necessary to Assistant Director Belmont for a decision.

Executives' Conference Recommendation: (Unanimous)

The Executives' Conference unanimously felt that an additional step is desirable at this time to insure that

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

the placing of individuals on the Security Index is approved at a high level. Therefore, the Conference recommended that in the future the review and approval of the inclusion of the names of individuals be personally handled by Supervisor , the Supervisor in Charge of this work; the Chief of the Internal Security Section or Inspector , who is in charge of the Internal Security-Licensor Branch of the Domestic Intelligence Division. In cases of disagreement the case will come to Assistant Director noted that this will throw an additional burden on representatives of the Division already handling a very heavy assignment. However, it will be worked out.

The Conference further noted that as the results of the field review of the current Security Index subjects are received at the Sect of Government, the cases will be reviewed by the Domestic Intelligence Division.

(5) Mr. further recommended that a group of five specially qualified Agents be brought in from the field for the purpose of instituting an independent and continuous review of the Security Index and to act in the role of "devil's advocate" in making such a review. The remainder of the Conference recommended that this not be done, as it was felt that the steps outlined above were a more desirable approach to the problem.

If you agree, we will be guided by the recommendation of the majority in this instance.

Respectfully,  
For the Conference

1. I agree with  
majority.

2. What concerns me is the

did not sense there  
defects in the procedure. I have rehearsed  
by phone several times about the project. I  
recall concerning ~~regarding~~  
~~stage a re-evaluation of it & comment(s)~~  
~~with a consultant~~ ~~available which~~

1845

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 1/24/55

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

I have studied the current instructions to the field relative to the Security Index and the criteria to be used in placing the names of persons on this index. The Bureau obviously is responsible for more than assembling facts for referral to the Department of Justice for its decision with respect to the persons listed on this index; since the situation now is that the FBI, from all practical standpoints, is making the decision that the person whose name is placed on the index will be taken into custody in the event of hostilities and the FBI will be held responsible for any improper arrests which cannot be justified before the administrative or judicial boards which will consider the cases of those persons taken into custody.

It is obvious to me that we must provide a very strict policy with respect to placing the names of persons on this index. The manual provisions in this respect are somewhat misleading. They state, for example "In preparing and maintaining the security index, the Bureau is acting only in the capacity of assembling the facts concerning the individuals involved for referral to the appropriate officials of the Department of Justice for their consideration and decision as to action to be taken at a time of national emergency." It seems to me that we in the Bureau must conform to the basic premise that any person to be placed on the index is considered as potentially dangerous to the internal security of the United States in the event of a national emergency and that the FBI is in possession of facts to prove this in every case in the event our action is challenged, as it will certainly be in literally thousands of cases.

Some of the factors to be considered in determining the dangerousness of the individual, as covered in the manual, seem to me to be very weak, such as Section 87C (2-D) Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization; (2-I) Contributions to or collections of funds for the organization, and (2-Q) Refusal to furnish information or to testify regarding membership or activities in a subversive movement.

The manual, with respect to the handling of these cases in the field, merely states that the Agent handling the case in the

office of origin should submit a form recommendation (Form FD-122.) There is no specific requirement that the Special Agent in Charge shall personally review and approve the recommendation. This will probably be influenced in part by the fact that the majority of the SAC's in this country, if the letters provide that it is the responsibility of the individual SAC to insure that his cases are properly investigated and evaluated.

I would like to recommend an SAC Letter cautioning the field as to the seriousness of inclusions of names of persons on this list and pointing out that we are in effect making the decisions for arrests since the Department of Justice has not and apparently will not arrange for attorneys to review and approve such inclusions.

I recommend that we make it the personal responsibility of the SAC to make such recommendations and that we hold them responsible for such actions, except as to New York as indicated below.

At the Seat of Government I am advised that at present the approval of placing the name of a person on the index is made by an individual supervisor, one of many who handle this type of work. The recommendation and approval of this individual supervisor is reviewed and approved by one other lone experienced supervisor in the Internal Security Section, whose responsibility it is to review and pass upon such recommendations. Questionable or doubtful cases, or cases of disagreement are then referred to the office of the Section Chief of the Internal Security Section, Mr. [redacted], for a decision and then if no decision is reached, or in cases of particular importance, they are referred to Mr. [redacted] for decision.

At the Seat of Government it is my recommendation that in the future the review and approval of the inclusion of the names of individuals be personally handled by Supervisor [redacted], the supervisor in charge of this work, the Chief of the Internal Security Section, or Inspector [redacted] who is in overall charge of the Internal Security - Liaison Branch of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

In the field both active and inactive subjects on this list are checked each 6 months as to their whereabouts. With respect to inactive subjects, there is a requirement that the case be brought up to date, analyzed and evaluated annually by the submission of a field report. However, there is no specific requirement for a renewed recommendation from the field at any time for the continuance of the person on the index.

I would like to recommend an annual consideration by the field on both active and inactive subjects as to whether the person should be continued on the index and that this, in line with the above recommendation, be the personal responsibility of the Special Agent in Charge.

1845

I am advised that in New York City there are approximately 7128 security index subjects. It is not required that the New York Office reopen their inactive cases for the purpose of bringing them up to date annually as it required of other offices. A moratorium was declared for New York in this connection because of personnel limitations. New York does have a program of reactivating the cases which are observed to be the oldest at the time they make their 6 months check on whereabouts.

In New York City, in view of the volume of work, it would be my recommendation that the responsibility for reviewing recommended inclusions on the security index be that of the Special Agent in Charge, an Assistant Special Agent in Charge, or a qualified security supervisor.

*New-Y.*

If the foregoing recommendations are approved, within a comparatively short period of time we would be able to effect a review of all security index subjects in the light of our current responsibilities, as pointed out above.

Subject to your approval, I will discuss the above recommendations with the Executives Conference to see whether there are any reasons why they should not be placed into effect.

This is imperative  
of a time limit must  
be set. *K.*

Yes & promptly.  
*K.*

CONFIDENTIAL

2/9/55

In view of recent international situation relating to China, desired necessary to have up-to-date index of all Chinese racial organizations existing in three categories mentioned in instructions to Director, viz: (1) Chinese racial organizations, (2) Chinese racial organizations, and (3) non-Chinese sympathetic to Communist China.

During the past year, Security Index Card Section has developed jointly with Security Index Card Section, Chinese and India has been set up. This classification will be continued and eventually Chinese racial field will call attention the additions to Security Index Card and Index Card will be revised to determine what or who should be listed under this program. With respect (1) above, the non-Chinese, as above set up a similar index. It will also be this field are disclosed but index provides for other classifications.

As mechanical means of further insurance, it is proposed that field, in addition now subject to security index, include an additional field under "Other" - "Chinese" where subject to Chinese racial extraction. This additional classification will be provided by Security Index Card to enable inquiry from any requestor to whom the list of persons in security index of Chinese racial extraction. Similarly field will be required to security mention in communications regarding compiling of Security Index card that subject to Chinese racial extraction.


With respect to non-Chinese sympathetic to Communist China, the field will be required to call to attention of items now above being added to Security Index in two category.

1-9-55

by including statement on recommendation form under Miscellaneous "Subject sympathetic to Communist China," as additive to any other notations under this heading. With respect to cases already on Security Index where evidence is developed of professed Chinese sympathies, field will be required to direct separate letter to Bureau pointing out this development and recommending consideration of subject under this program. These requirements will enable Bureau to keep close check on these lists and to make additions and deletions when necessary.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Attached is proposed SAC letter to field (a) explaining purpose of program to them, (b) instructing where subject of recommended Security Index card is of Chinese racial extraction to indicate on form under Race, "Other - Chinese," (c) instructing that all communications recommending cancellation of Security Index cards on persons of Chinese racial extraction must specifically mention the Chinese racial extraction aspect, (d) instructing that with respect to new cases recommended for Security Index on non-Chinese sympathetic to Communist China form FD-122 must indicate this under "Miscellaneous," and (e) instructing further that on existing cases on non-Chinese on Security Index where investigation reveals Chinese sympathies warranting consideration under this program separate letter must be directed to Bureau pointing this out and recommending consideration under program.
2. It is recommended the Statistical Section make arrangements to record on the IBM equipment the connotation Race "Other - Chinese" on all future approved FD-122 forms. Attached is a list of all persons on Security Index now of Chinese racial extraction which should be so recorded. The recording of the list attached and all future "Other - Chinese" should enable us to run off when needed complete list of persons on Security Index of Chinese racial extraction.



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SOLIDLY CONFIDENTIAL  
FILE NUMBER 55-12

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 10, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- In view of recent developments in the international situation it has become necessary to re-evaluate the priority of arrest features of our Security Index Program. At the present time subjects who will be considered for priority of arrest in the time of an emergency are tabbed Detcom and the Detcom classification includes subjects who are tabbed Comsab.

Henceforth, it is planned that the individuals in the Security Index tabbed Detcom will be arrested first in the event of a limited but grave emergency. It is not anticipated at this time that the other subjects in the Security Index will be arrested under such a situation. (In the event of an all-out emergency all subjects whose names are included in the Security Index will be considered for immediate apprehension.)

In order that the most dangerous persons will be apprehended during a limited but grave emergency, there are set forth below the new standards to be used in deciding who should be listed for priority of apprehension and Detcom tabbing.

1. The Comsab tabbing is to be discontinued.
2. Each Security Index subject should be considered for Detcom tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of the following categories:
  - a. All Top Functionaries and Key Figures.
  - b. Currently active Communists (active within the past year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or more of the following:
    - (1) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization.
    - (2) Special training at the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow.
    - (3) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men or active participation in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.
    - (4) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities.

2-10-55

- c. Persons active in the Communist Party underground.
- d. Any other Security Index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent or disruptionist in the event of an emergency.

Subjects who will be tabbed Detcom should comprise a hardcore of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own and the decision to consider a subject for priority of apprehension should be based on the subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies. Employment in a key or vital facility will no longer be a reason alone for Detcom tabbing.

In evaluating each Security Index case it will be necessary to review each case file. This should be done in connection with the review of all Security Index cases in accordance with the instructions in SAC Letter Number 55-8 dated February 2, 1955. In submitting your personal recommendation for retaining a subject in the Security Index you should also submit your recommendation regarding the Detcom tabbing as indicated above along with your reasons why the subject meets the new Detcom standards in sufficient detail to justify your recommendation. If a subject is tabbed Detcom and Comsab at this time and you are not recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions you should submit a Form FD-122 attached to your Security Index recommendation in order to delete the Detcom and Comsab tablings. If you are recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions and the subject is already tabbed Detcom, you should so advise the Bureau and Form FD-122 need not be submitted. In instances in which you are recommending the Detcom tabbing and the subject is already tabbed Detcom and Comsab you should attach a Form FD-122 in order that the Comsab tabbing can be deleted. Of course, if the subject is not already tabbed Detcom and you are recommending such tabbing under the new instructions, you should attach a Form FD-122 to your Security Index recommendation in order that the Detcom tabbing can be added to the Security Index card.

There will be instances in which you have already submitted your recommendations that a Security Index subject should be retained in the Security Index. In those instances it will be necessary for you to recheck the individual case files to determine whether a Detcom tabbing is necessary and to advise the Bureau in accordance

2/10/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

with the above instructions.

In order that the Security Index cards for the subjects who are to be tabbed Detcom for priority of apprehension, as indicated above, will be readily available for emergency action in your office you should be guided by the following instructions regarding the arrangement of your Security Index.

1. Each Security Index case should be considered for Detcom tabbing whether the subject's Security Index card is filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of your Security Index. However, there is no change being made in the instructions regarding the Security Index cards which are to be filed in those three sections.

2. The Geographical Section of your Security Index should be divided into two distinct parts. Part I of the Geographical Section shall include only the Security Index cards for subjects who are tabbed Detcom under the new instructions set out above. Part II of the Geographical Section will contain the Security Index cards for all subjects that are not tabbed Detcom.

3. In offices having a Geographical breakdown by residence and by employment it will be necessary to have two breakdowns for each of those categories in order that the cards tabbed Detcom will be separated and maintained apart from the cards not so tabbed.

4. You should continue to file one Security Index card for each subject in the Alphabetical Section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever. To assist you in readily identifying Security Index cards in the Alphabetical Section that will be tabbed Detcom under the new instructions a colored metal tab shall be fastened to each such card.

For your information, in the future as Detcom tablings are approved the Security Index cards forwarded to you will not only carry the code letters DC in the first line on the cards but each such card will be stamped Detcom in large red letters. This procedure will assist you in being absolutely certain that cards tabbed Detcom are properly filed.

The Detcom tabbing of a Security Index subject should be afforded your personal consideration and you should submit your personal recommendations for such tabbing during this review and in the future. In handling this matter in connection with your review of all Security Index cases, you should meet the deadlines as set forth in SAC Letter 55-8 dated February 2, 1955. Security Index cards presently tabbed Detcom should not be placed in the new Detcom portion of the Geographical Section of your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations. There should be no changes made regarding the present Detcom tabbings in your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations under the new procedure. In this manner the entire Security Index will be reviewed and reconsideration given to Detcom tabbings by the periods indicated in SAC Letter Number 55-8.

In view of the new and separate breakdown in the Geographical Section of your Security Index for Detcom subjects it will no longer be necessary to place a separate tab on such cards as you have done in the past.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2/10/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

- 4 -

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :  
FROM : EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: February 1st,  
1955

The Executives' Conference on February 8, 1955,  
consisting of Messrs.

the mechanics to be used by Mr. , considered  
of the Security Index Unit; Mr. Supervisor in charge  
Internal Security Section; or Inspector , Chief of the  
charge of the Internal Security-Liaison Branch of the Domestic  
Intelligence Division, in reviewing for approval, the names of  
individuals for inclusion in our Security Index.

BACKGROUND:

On January 25, 1955, the Executives' Conference recommended  
and the Director approved that Messrs. would  
have to personally approve the inclusion of all names of individuals  
which are placed in our Security Index and in case of disagreement  
the case will be referred to Assistant Director for decision.

In order that this additional work, which will be considerable  
in volume, can be handled by Messrs. , the  
following administrative procedures were presented to the Executives'  
Conference on February 8, 1955:

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE:

The Supervisors assigned to the Security Index Unit, after  
they have completed their review of a case and have decided that  
the name of the subject should be included in the Security Index,  
will prepare a memorandum which will set forth briefly and succinctly  
the facts on which they based their conclusion. The case will then  
be forwarded, as is now done, to one experienced Supervisor who  
reviews all cases before the subject's name can be considered for  
inclusion in the Security Index. He will review the case, as in  
the past, and from that point an equal division will be made of the  
cases for review by Messrs. . The memo-  
randum will assist them in their review in that the cases which are  
clear-cut can be handled in a minimum of time from a review of the  
memorandum. They will rely completely on the facts set forth in  
the memoranda in reaching their decisions. In controversial cases  
they, of course, will review the reports in order to reach a decision.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR.

The Supervisors in the Internal Security Section cannot, for any sustained period, prepare these summary-type memoranda and still keep their work in a current status. They are receiving a large volume of mail and this extra work of having to prepare a memorandum in each case they review will create a delinquency in the Security Index Unit which will be most undesirable. Therefore, in the future, the investigating Agent at the conclusion of his investigation will attach to the Form 122 (this is the form used to recommend the inclusion of a name in the Security Index) a succinct summary of the facts on which he based his recommendation for including the name of the subject in the Security Index. In line with existing instructions, the Special Agent in Charge will personally approve each case wherein a recommendation is made to include the subject's name in our Security Index.

When the report and the Form 122 are received at the Seat of Government, the Supervisors in the Security Index Unit will review the case file as they have done in the past. They will then put an addendum on the summary attached to the Form 122 in which they will indicate any other pertinent factors not listed and indicate their agreement or disagreement with the recommendation from the field. The case will then be sent to the experienced Supervisor in the Security Index Unit who reviews all cases before the names of the subjects can be considered for inclusion in the Security Index and from his desk the cases will be sent to Moscow and for review and approval.

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION (Unanimous):

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that the above-outlined procedure be put into effect.

If you agree, there is attached an SAC letter which sets forth instructions to the field with respect to the portions of this procedure which will be implemented by the field.

CH  
H

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 2/11/55

TO :

FROM : *W*

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

SYNOPSIS:

Each month we follow the field closely on the status of security work by analyzing the backlog of pending cases and delinquency in Espionage, Internal Security, Security latter and foreign intelligence cases in classifications and . Status of these cases as of January 31, 1955, is set forth herein.

Pending active matters in the entire field in the security classifications decreased substantially from 23,161 to 22,573. Delinquent matters increased from 6,697 to 6,806 with the resultant over-all statistical increase from 28.8 per cent to 29.7 per cent. The delinquent security cases in the New York Office increased from 1,492 to 1,629, increasing delinquency from 26.4 per cent to 27.7 per cent. The number of pending active matters in the classification increased in the New York Office from 4,117 to 4,373 and the delinquent items in this classification increased from 1,232 to 1,332 or statistical delinquency 30.5 per cent.

Although over-all pending and pending active security cases were decreased substantially in January, delinquent cases increased somewhat particularly in some of the 12 large offices noted on page 4 herein. The 40 smaller offices listed on page 7 had a total of 6,216 pending active security cases of which 1,201 were delinquent, approximately 19 per cent as contrasted to 33.6 per cent security delinquency of the 12 large offices, as computed from 5,605 delinquent cases of a total of 16,662 pending active items in those 12 combined offices.

Letters are being sent to the large offices indicated by asterisks on page 4, pointing out to them forcefully that security delinquency must be reduced. Similar letters are being sent to the smaller offices indicated by asterisks on page 7 herein. A total of 13 letters are being sent to the field in this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

The field will continue to be followed closely regarding secur

delinquency and you will be advised of the results of the review of the February, 1955, administrative reports.

DETAILS:

Since December, 1951, we have been following, on a monthly basis, the twelve field offices having a large proportion of our pending security work and since March, 1952, all offices. We have written letters to the twelve offices and to other offices where progress in reducing the backlog of work and delinquency has not been satisfactory.

The January, 1955, administrative reports from all offices reflect that the total pending active matters in the classifications decreased substantially from 23,181 to 22,878. The delinquent items increased from 6,697 to 6,806, which represents a statistical increase of from 28.8 per cent to 29.7 per cent.

The following statistics reflect the status of pending work including both pending active and pending inactive matters and delinquency for all field divisions as of December 31, 1951, and the progress for the last four months:

<u>Classification</u>	<u>TOTAL PENDING MATTERS</u>				
	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>	<u>1-31-55</u>
	1,314	1,066	1,035	1,050	1,017
	32,812	21,911	22,419	22,075	21,790
	<u>2,895</u>	<u>3,428</u>	<u>3,493</u>	<u>3,565</u>	<u>3,556</u>
Total	37,021	26,405	26,947	26,690	26,363

TOTAL DELINQUENT MATTERS  
CLASSIFICATIONS  
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Classification</u>	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>	<u>1-31-55</u>
	525	163	170	136	137
	22,518	5,580	6,018	5,890	5,969
	<u>1,719</u>	<u>670</u>	<u>730</u>	<u>671</u>	<u>700</u>
Total	24,762	6,413	6,918	6,697	6,806

The following statistics reflect the total of pending active matters, delinquency and percentage of delinquency of all offices since January 31, 1953.

CLASSIFICATIONS  
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
1-31-53	24,098	11,772	48.8%
2-28-53	22,935	11,233	46.9%
3-31-53	23,033	10,890	47.3%
4-30-53	22,100	9,120	41.3%
5-31-53	21,740	9,730	44.8%
6-30-53	20,970	9,558	45.6%
7-31-53	20,180	9,411	46.6%
8-31-53	19,493	8,495	43.6%
9-30-53	19,224	7,571	39.4%
10-31-53	19,141	5,580	34.3%
11-30-53	19,833	6,655	33.5%
12-31-53	19,947	6,749	33.2%
1-31-54	20,520	7,494	36.5%
2-28-54	21,488	6,007	27.9%
3-31-54	21,848	6,617	30.2%
4-30-54	21,752	6,757	31.6%
5-31-54	21,863	7,822	35.8%
6-30-54	22,278	7,407	33.2%
7-31-54	22,977	7,163	31.6%
8-31-54	22,361	7,010	31.3%
9-30-54	23,011	6,720	29.1%
10-31-54	22,452	6,413	28.5%
11-30-54	23,179	6,918	29.7%
12-31-54	23,181	6,697	28.8%
1-31-55	22,878	6,806	29.7%

Status of Security Work in Twelve of the Larger Offices

The following statistics reflect the progress of the twelve larger offices we have been closely following since December, 1951. These offices have approximately 80 per cent of the total Security Index cards and a high percentage of the pending work and delinquency in classifications.

STATISTICS FOR TWELVE OFFICES  
SECURITY INDEX COUNT AND FOR  
MATTERS

<u>Office</u>	<u>Security Index Cards 1-14-55</u>	<u>Pending Matters 12-31-54</u>	<u>Active Matters 1-31-55</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent 12-31-54</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent 1-31-55</u>
* New York	7,128	5,640	5,890	26.4%	27.7%
* Los Angeles	4,220	2,332	2,301	32%	39%
* San Francisco	2,352	1,814	1,584	42%	49%
* Chicago	1,539	1,416	1,487	46%	49%
* Detroit	1,358	965	965	38%	43%
Philadelphia	1,210	982	915	24%	22%
* Newark	918	1,130	1,090	29%	29%
* Cleveland	682	492	536	23%	26%
* Boston	689	702	701	28%	26%
Seattle	684	393	365	27%	21%
* New Haven	539	565	517	30%	36%
Minneapolis	531	301	311	13%	18%
Total	21,850	16,732	16,662		

\* Letters being sent to offices indicated. See page 8 herein.

The over-all statistics for the eleven offices other than the New York Office since August 31, 1952, are as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters ( )</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters ( )</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
8-31-52	12,611	7,589	60.2%
9-30-52	11,367	5,732	50.4%
10-31-52	11,286	4,957	43.9%
11-30-52	11,148	4,844	43.5%
12-31-52	10,937	4,578	41.9%
1-31-53	10,730	4,696	43.8%
2-28-53	10,721	4,358	39.9%
3-31-53	10,069	4,019	30.7%
4-30-53	9,411	2,887	37.2%
5-31-53	9,277	3,447	39.4%
6-30-53	8,964	3,532	42.2%
7-31-53	8,908	3,758	42.3%
8-31-53	8,547	3,618	37.8%
9-30-53	8,601	3,249	31.4%
10-31-53	8,845	2,785	30.4%
11-30-53	9,434	2,871	34.1%
12-31-53	9,552	3,261	33.6%
1-31-54	9,814	3,318	29.4%
2-28-54	10,288	3,021	29.4%
3-31-54	10,188	2,998	31.5%
4-30-54	10,201	3,209	39.8%
5-31-54	9,840	3,920	37.5%
6-30-54	8,839	3,679	32.4%
7-31-54	10,317	3,348	33.4%
8-31-54	10,048	3,364	32.7%
9-30-54	10,669	3,488	31.9%
10-31-54	10,557	3,376	34.5%
11-30-54	11,063	3,822	33.6%
12-31-54	11,092	3,728	36.9%
1-31-55	10,772	3,976	

New York Office

In January, 1954, the New York delinquency stood at 53 per cent. It was reduced, however, in February, 1954, to 32 per cent and during the period March through September, 1954, averaged 38 per cent. In October, 1954, the New York security delinquency dropped to 30.9 per cent, on November 30, 1954, to 29.3 per cent, and on December 31, 1954, to 26.4 per cent, the figure in each successive instance representing the lowest percentage of delinquency in the security classifications which had existed in the New York Office since this matter has been followed on a regular basis by the Bureau.

New York Office since August 31, 1954.

1343

The January, 1955, administrative report of the New York Office reveals that security delinquency has increased from 26.4 per cent in December, 1954, the lowest figure ever computed for that office, to 27.7 per cent as of January 31, 1955. The latter figure resulted from increases in both pending active matters from 5,640 to 5,690 and delinquent items, from 1,492 to 1,629.

The New York Office has approximately 25 per cent of the pending active matters in the classifications in the entire field. This office also has approximately 23.9 per cent of the number of delinquent items in these classifications throughout the field. The average delinquency in all other offices at the end of January, 1955, was approximately 30.5 per cent. The New York delinquency was 27.7 per cent as previously noted.

The bulk of the New York backlog and delinquency is in the classification. During January, 1955, the number of pending active matters in the classification in the New York Office increased from 4,117 to 4,373. The number of delinquent matters in this classification increased from 1,232 to 1,332 with a statistical increase from 29.9 per cent for December, 1954, to 30.5 per cent as of January 31, 1955.

#### Status of Security Work in the Remaining Forty Offices

The remaining forty offices are listed according to the percentage of delinquency on January 31, 1955, in total matters in classifications. These statistics reflect the progress during January, 1955. It should be noted that many of the smaller offices have no pending matters in classifications and their entire pending backlog is in classification

matters. During the period March 1, 1954, to October 1, 1954, the percentage of delinquency increased from 26.4 per cent on November 1, 1954, to 27.7 per cent. The lowest percentage of delinquency in the Bureau had existed in the New York Office since it had been a regular basis of the Bureau.

<u>Office</u>	<u>Active Matters</u>		<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>	
	<u>12-31-54</u>	<u>1-31-55</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>	<u>1-31-55</u>
* Little Rock	31	20	42%	40%
* Cincinnati	373	322	20%	33%
* Baltimore	632	490	28%	32%
* Miami	202	207	20%	28%
Milwaukee	269	237	33%	23%
Albany	363	280	44%	22%
Charlotte	113	93	27%	22%
Mobile	52	65	17%	22%
San Juan	149	141	15%	20%
Houston	68	69	19%	20%
Indianapolis	172	178	25%	20%
Kansas City	89	107	20%	20%
Omaha	58	56	9%	20%
Phoenix	78	98	20%	19%
Oklahoma City	42	48	25%	19%
Pittsburgh	226	353	21%	19%
Washington Field	922	949	22%	18%
Richmond	96	95	11%	18%
Salt Lake City	70	74	25%	17%
Buffalo	578	490	24%	17%
Springfield	104	126	9%	16%
El Paso	41	42	27%	16%
San Diego	205	256	15%	15%
Birmingham	35	34	16%	15%
Louisville	52	47	21%	14%
Norfolk	66	69	27%	13%
New Orleans	145	136	17%	13%
St. Louis	276	268	21%	12%
Albuquerque	58	65	7%	12%
Knoxville	35	33	25%	9%
Dallas	82	77	30%	9%
Denver	211	172	23%	9%
San Antonio	51	57	14%	8%
Atlanta	91	95	20%	8%
Butte	56	75	9%	8%
Portland	127	146	10%	6%
Anchorage	34	36	7%	6%
Savannah	28	34	21%	4%
Memphis	35	45	11%	0%
Honolulu	34	31	9%	

\* Letters sent to offices indicated regarding delinquent status.  
See page 8 herein.

The following figures illustrate the progress of the forty offices as a whole since December 31, 1952, as reflected in the administrative reports:


<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u> <u>( )</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters</u> <u>( )</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
12-31-52	6,228	1,691	27.2%
1-31-53	6,080	1,554	25.6%
2-28-53	6,103	1,515	24.6%
3-31-53	5,936	1,542	26.0%
4-30-53	5,864	1,414	24.1%
5-31-53	4,897	1,726	29.3%
6-30-53	5,611	1,577	28.1%
7-31-53	5,146	1,358	26.4%
8-31-53	5,095	1,323	26.0%
9-30-53	5,050	1,219	24.1%
10-31-53	4,987	1,087	21.8%
11-30-53	5,180	1,355	26.1%
12-31-53	5,280	1,301	24.6%
1-31-54	5,562	1,444	25.9%
2-28-54	5,997	1,347	22.5%
3-31-54	6,079	1,431	23.5%
4-30-54	6,174	1,327	21.5%
5-31-54	6,733	1,710	25.4%
6-30-54	7,022	1,522	21.6%
7-31-54	6,910	1,590	23.0%
8-31-54	6,728	1,520	22.5%
9-30-54	6,710	1,410	21.0%
10-31-54	6,594	1,398	21.2%
11-30-54	6,767	1,519	22.4%
12-31-54	6,449	1,477	22.4%
1-31-55	6,216	1,201	19.3%

#### Letters to the Field

Atlanta Although over-all pending and pending active security cases were decreased substantially in January, delinquent cases increased somewhat, particularly in some of the 12 large offices noted on page 4 herein. The 40 smaller offices listed on page 7 had a total of 6,216 pending active security cases of which 1,201 were delinquent, approximately 19 per cent as contrasted to 33.6 per cent security delinquency of the 12 large offices computed from 5,605 delinquent cases of a total of 16,662 pending active items in those 12 combined offices.

\*Letters are being sent to the large offices indicated by asterisks on page 4, pointing out to them forcefully that security delinquency must be reduced. Similar letters are being sent to the smaller offices indicated by asterisks on page 7 herein. A total of 13 letters are being sent to the field in this matter.

MAILED  
2-12-55



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
SAC LETTER NO. 30-10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 17, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

General

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- In the future, at the time a Form FD-122 is submitted to the Bureau recommending the inclusion of a name in the Security Index, there must be attached to it an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of the facts on which you have based your recommendation for including the name in the Security Index. These facts must be in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and the sources from which the information came must be properly characterized as to reliability. The summary must also contain pertinent dates with respect to the activities of the subject.

In those instances when, at the conclusion of a security investigation, you are not recommending the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index, there shall be set forth on the administrative page of the closing report a brief summary statement which will reflect the reasons upon which you have based your decision.

RECORDED

2-17-55

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/17/55

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

*6-17-55*  
This is in response to Mr. [redacted] inquiry about machine listings by Statistical Section that might be requested under an emergency in the Red China situation.

(1) We are recording and can list Chinese aliens and citizens in the index.

(2) Pursuant to memo cited below we are not recording non-Chinese subjects sympathetic to Communist China. This information is being kept in a typed card index in the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Current instructions contained in memo of Mr. [redacted] to Mr. [redacted], 2/9/55, Chinese Communist Activities In The United States. Internal Security - CH and SAC letter Number 55-14, 2/15/55, paragraph (I).

JAN 1955  
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 2/17/55

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
INTERNAL SECURITY - CH

At a conference in the office of the Attorney General on February 7, 1955, the Attorney General ruled that in the event of an emergency by reason of the Formosa crisis, the Chinese aliens on our Security Index should be picked up by the FBI on deportation warrants. Based upon this, 36 warrants of arrest dated February 11, 1955, signed by Acting Attorney General [redacted], were delivered to the Bureau. On February 14, 1955, we conferred with Mr. [redacted] of the Internal Security Division concerning certain procedural questions regarding the execution of the warrants of arrest. These warrants were furnished to our interested Field Offices by letter dated February 15, 1955.

At the request of Mr. [redacted] Special Agents [redacted] met with Mr. [redacted], Chief of Special Investigations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, (INS); Mr. [redacted], Assistant Chief of Special Investigations, INS; Mr. [redacted], Departmental Attorney, and Mr. [redacted] in the latter's office this afternoon. At that time we again discussed procedures to be followed in executing the deportation warrants. As a result thereof, upon advice of the Immigration representatives the following steps were directed by Mr. [redacted]:

1. At the time the warrant is served by the Bureau Agents on the Chinese alien, the alien should be advised of his right to counsel and should be advised that the Attorney General is holding him in custody without bond. The alien should be furnished a copy of the warrant and the Agent should read to him the charges as they appear on the face of the warrant. The alien should also be advised where he will be held in custody.
2. The alien should then be removed by Bureau Agents to the nearest Federal approved jail and booked for INS.
3. Immediately following the incarceration of the alien, the Bureau Agents should notify the nearest District Director of the INS or the nearest Officer

in Charge of an INS Suboffice, whichever is closest. (For example, if an alien is picked up at Newark and lodged in a Federal approved jail at Newark, notification should be made to the Officer in Charge of the INS Suboffice at Newark, New Jersey, rather than to the District Director of Immigration who is located at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.) At the time of notification the Agent should advise the proper INS official that the alien has been taken into custody upon a warrant for deportation executed by the Attorney General and that the Attorney General has ruled that the alien is to be held without bond. The Agent should also advise where the alien has been incarcerated.

4. Following notification, the original warrant executed by the Bureau Agents should be delivered to the nearest District Director of INS or the nearest Officer in Charge of an INS Suboffice, whichever is closest.

At the meeting the INS representatives raised questions as to the charges which were cited against the various aliens. It was pointed out that probably some of the aliens for whom warrants had been issued were already subjects of deportation proceedings by reason of which substantive questions would arise which would have to be resolved between the Department and INS. The INS, at the request of Mr. [redacted], is presently determining the immigration status of the 36 Chinese aliens and at the urging of Mr. [redacted] stated that they would have it available for him early next week at which time the Department could then consider each case individually.

The INS representatives also pointed out that in deportation proceedings it was essential to have legally admissible evidence. Mr. [redacted] stated that when the immigration status of these individuals was ascertained the Department would study this problem with respect to each individual case.

INS representatives stated it would materially expedite their inquiries as to the immigration status of the aliens if they could be furnished with the aliens' current residence addresses. This is so because since INS has decentralized their records, it is necessary for them to make inquiry of their District Directors.

Since the residence addresses of these aliens are readily available at the Bureau, INS was advised that we would furnish such list to them through Liaison. This has been done.

ACTION:

(1) There is attached a teletype to our interested Field Offices advising them of the changes in the procedure for executing the warrants.

(2) We are also preparing a letter to Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, to the attention of Mr. , with a carbon copy to INS, attention Mr. , which will confirm the procedures as outlined above.

OK b)

3

APR 1 1955  
2-21-55

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 21,  
1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

The Director instructed in connection with the 2-day Espionage Conference in New York City on February 17 and 18, 1955, that we take this opportunity to also get over the views about care and discriminating screening of the Security Index.

On Thursday morning, February 17, I discussed this problem with the Conference. I pointed out that the maintenance of persons on our Security Index is on the Bureau's responsibility and that the Department is not reviewing such designations. It was emphasized that in the current review of the Security Index, it is imperative that subjects be eliminated if information concerning them is not solid and does not clearly justify their continuance on the Index. I emphasized that in reviewing these cases, the Supervisors and Special Agents in Charge should bear in mind that in the event of a national emergency the subjects will in all probability be jailed for a period of up to thirty days before there is an opportunity for a hearing board to consider the cases and that such incarceration will be strictly the responsibility of the FBI; consequently, maintenance on the Index should be considered in light of the responsibility of the Bureau in taking this action of jailing the subjects on its own responsibility. It was emphasized that when this review is completed there should be no doubts in the minds of the supervisory officials and Special Agents in Charge that our Security Index is sound and that apprehensions at the time of a national emergency can be thoroughly justified in all respects. I noted to the Conference that there is no change in the standards by which persons are considered for the Index and that each case must be considered on its own merits.

1249

~~cc - Mr.~~  
~~cc - Mr.~~

Assistant Attorney General

February 21, 1955

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX LIST

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of the individuals maintained in the Security Index. Names included in the main portion of the list are arranged alphabetically. The names of individuals coming within five designated groups are listed on separate pages. Following each name is information reflecting the race, sex, birth date, Bureau file number and the Bureau field office covering the residence of the individual.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment (1)

NOTE ON YELLOW ONLY:  
Espionage section of the Special Section not included. The five designated groups are:

Foreign Government Employees  
United Nations Employees  
Pro-Tito Yugoslavs  
U. S. Government Employees  
Atomic Energy Program Employees

Delivered by wire  
Person 1513  
FEB 21 1955  
Office EGOS:mjt  
(6)

RECORDED 6

124 FEB 23 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/18/55

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 20 cards were added to the Security Index and 6 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 14 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,718.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 2/11/55

S FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
Bufile

The following is a report of the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on January 14, 1955.

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
January 15-21	52	9	43
January 22-28	37	19	18
January 28-Feb. 4	56	9	47
February 5-11	14	15	(-1) 11
	159	52	107

For your information, during the preceding four-week period 26 cards were added and 66 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 260 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,704.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

2-15-55

(I) CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES - INTERNAL SECURITY - CH - SECURITY INDEX - In view of the current international situation the Bureau has seriously considered the possibility that instructions may be received to apprehend persons on the Security Index of Chinese extraction and non-Chinese sympathetic to Communist China, in the event of an emergency involving Communist China. Henceforth, in recommending a subject for Security Index who is of Chinese extraction it is essential that you show on the recommendation form (FD-122) where the indication of "Race" is required, the words "Other - Chinese." Similarly, in any communication recommending cancellation of a Security Index card where the person is of Chinese extraction the communication must specifically mention this fact.

With respect to non-Chinese (persons not of Chinese extraction) who have shown definite sympathies with Communist China and who are being recommended for the Security Index you should include a statement on the form (FD-122) under "Miscellaneous" to the effect "sympathetic to Communist China." This statement should be in addition to any other data which you would normally include at this point on the form. This statement should be made only after careful reflection as it will constitute your recommendation that the sympathies of this subject with Communist China are such that he merits consideration for apprehension in the event of an emergency. The Bureau recently solicited your recommendations with respect to existing cases on the Security Index on non-Chinese sympathetic to Communist China and your recommendations have been reviewed. However, your continuing investigations of existing Security Index subjects may develop information on subjects additional to those previously recommended showing definite sympathies with Communist China. On such cases you should direct a communication to the Bureau in the individual case, pointing out the information developed, and submitting your recommendation as to his inclusion in this program.

2/15/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-14

UNCLASSIFIED  
2-15-55

It is possible that any order for the apprehension of Security Index subjects in the event of an emergency with Communist China may be directed solely at aliens or may include citizens. It is absolutely essential that the citizenship status of each subject be definitely verified and that the Security Index card accurately reflect his status at all times.

You should see that all personnel in your office engaged in security work are thoroughly familiar with these instructions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2/15/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-14

2

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: December 3,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: RE SUGGESTION 41-53  
DESCRIPTION ON REVERSE SIDE OF  
SECURITY INDEX CARDS  
BUFILE

On February 17, 1953, the Executive Conference recommended favorably as to the suggestion of SA [redacted], then assigned to the Los Angeles Office and now assigned as a supervisor in the Internal Security Section at the Bureau, that when the paper stock for Security Index Cards is next ordered, there be placed on the reverse side along the left-hand margin printed words such as name, weight, height, hair, eyes and so forth, beside which descriptive data may be entered by the appropriate offices. At that time, there was over a year's supply of plain Security Index Card paper stock on hand. (M)

Printed stock in line with the suggestion is now being used for Security Index Cards sent to the field and the Training and Inspection Division has requested to be advised the approximate savings resulting from the use of the printed data on the back of each card.

It is estimated that approximately 30,000 sets of Security Index Cards are sent to the field each year by the Bureau to add new cards or amend cards in existence. Therefore, approximately 30,000 descriptions are typed on the back of Security Index Cards received in the field each year. The printed material consists of 27 words which requires approximately one minute of typing time. This represents a total field savings of 32 days typing time per year or approximately \$710 based on a Grade GS-3 typist salary. The additional cost of printing the words on the back of the paper stock is \$.50. The estimated net savings per year due to this change in procedure is approximately \$660.

## ACTION:

If you approve, this memorandum should be routed to the Training and Inspection Division for their information.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 2/25/55

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

SUBJECT:

With respect to the survey of the Security Index subjects I would like to personally review the cases of any persons now on the Index wherein the Domestic Intelligence Division proposes to overrule the recommendation of the SAC that the name of the subject be removed from the Index.

|OK. but ID is regrettable  
|that ... has to take  
|on this burden.  
J.

1854

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/21/55

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS

There are 26,702 persons represented in the Security Index (as of February 15, 1955). This is a net increase of 105 or 4/10ths of 1 percent over last month. Of the total, 24,843 or 93.0 percent are communists.

The race of Chinese in the index are now shown separately in the race breakdown on the attached table.

A detailed table is attached in duplicate. The table shows as of February 15, 1955, the distribution of the subjects by field office, nationalistic tendencies, dangerousness, sex, race, and citizenship. Also the number on "special lists" are shown. A key to abbreviations is attached.

Attachments

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS USED IN SECURITY INDEX

AL Alien  
CS Comsat  
DC Detcom  
KF Key Figure  
  
NA Naturalized  
NB Native Born  
TF Top Functionary  
UN Unknown

AEP Atomic Energy Program Employees  
BUL Bulgarian  
COM Communist Party, USA  
ESP Espionage Subjects  
  
FGE Foreign Government Employees  
GOV United States Government Employees  
HUN Hungarian  
ISL Independent Socialist League  
  
JFG Johnson Forest Group  
MCI Muslim Cult of Islam  
MIS Miscellaneous  
NPR Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico  
  
PPA Proletarian Party of America  
RUS Russian  
SUA Socialist Union of America  
SWP Socialist Workers' Party  
  
UNE United Nations Employees  
UPR Union of the People for the Establishment  
of the Republic of Puerto Rico  
YUG Yugoslavian

SECURITY INDEX CARDS OF VICTIMS - BY FIELD OFFICE  
BASED ON STATISTICAL SECTION REGULARS AS OF FEBRUARY 15.

a. Items do not add to total column but are included in Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7.

• 2 YD carried in P.I. of Special Section

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, San Antonio  
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX;  
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS,  
SOURCES AND WITNESSES

DATE: February 23, 1955

AIR MAIL

Re SAC Letter 55-15, A and B, dated 2/17/55.

Matters covered in that SAC letter have been discussed in detail with all Relief Supervisors in this office, with each new Agent during weekly conferences and with each headquarters and resident Agent while reviewing cases assigned to those Agents. Memoranda and ticklers have been prepared placing in effect instructions regarding addition of names to the Security Index, recording of indications of unreliability or instability of informants and sources, recording of information furnished by informant and reporting derogatory information concerning prospective witnesses. The entire matter has likewise been scheduled for detailed discussion at the semi-annual Agent's conference to be held April 6, 1955. The Bureau's instructions regarding these protective steps are thus being emphasized and reiterated to all Agents in this Division.

Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: February 24,  
1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX REVIEW  
Bufile

By SAC Letter 55-8 of February 2, 1955, a review of all Security Index cases was initiated. The field was instructed to submit airtel reports each Friday of the progress until the review is completed. Offices with less than 1,000 Security Index subjects were instructed to complete the project in sixty days. The remaining offices were instructed to complete the review in ninety days with the exception of New York which is to complete this project within six months.

There were 26,718 subjects included in the Security Index as of February 18, 1955.

The airtels of February 18, 1955, from the field reflect that 1,509 cases have been reviewed as of that date, approximately 5.6 per cent, and the required data forwarded to the Bureau.

As of February 24, 1955, 262 cases have been enclosed and processed in the Internal Security Section. Of this number, 227 cases have been forwarded by the field units to the Internal Security Section at the Bureau.

ACTION:

You will be kept advised of the progress of the reviews on a weekly basis.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :  
CJ  
FROM :

DATE: March 1, 1955

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX REVIEW  
Bufile

Attached is my memorandum of February 24, 1955, pertaining to captioned project. It is stated that as of February 24, 1955, 262 cases has been analyzed and processed in the Internal Security Section. Further, of the 262 cases, nine cancellations had been recommended by the SAC's and approved for cancellation in the review at the Bureau. Mr. [redacted] has noted: "If this is typical of the results of this processing, we will have to try a different approach."

The Director commented: "I certainly agree. Div. is not critically screening these. Just how many of the 262 were recommended by the SAC's for cancellation? H."

In response to the Director's inquiry, nine cases of the 262 processed were recommended for cancellation by the SAC's. In other words, every recommendation for cancellation made by the SAC's in the 262 cases was concurred in at the Bureau with no exceptions.

In response to Mr. [redacted] comment that we will have to try a different approach, this is to advise that I recommended to the Executives' Conference today certain specific guides to be sent to the field for use in evaluating the Security Index cases. The recommendation, which was approved by the Executives' Conference, is being submitted by a separate memorandum.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletypes message to: BUREAU

~~FBI, INDIANAPOLIS~~ 2-25-55 7:00 PM CST HH  
~~DIRECTOR, FBI~~

SECURITY INDEX REVIEWS. RE SAC LETTER 55-3, DATED FEBRUARY 2, 1955. IP  
HAS TOTAL OF 275 SI CARD SUBJECTS. AS OF FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 60 HAVE  
BEEN COMPLETED AND REQUIRED DATA SENT BUREAU.

18 28

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

Transmit the following ~~TELETYPE~~ message to:

FBI, LOS ANGELES

2/25/55

DIRECTOR, FBI

SECURITY INDEX REVIEW. RE SAC LETTER 55-8. TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES TO BE  
REVIEWED AT BEGINNING - 4216. TOTAL COMPLETED AS OF 2/25/55 - 495.

BALANCE TO BE DONE - 3721.

1857

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:  
AIRTEL

FBI, SPRINGFIELD ( 2-25-55

DIRECTOR, FBI

SECURITY INDEX REVIEW. RE SAC LETTER 55-8, DATED 2-2-55.

1. TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES TO BE REVIEWED - 92. 2. TOTAL NUMBER OF  
CASES DATA FORWARDED TO BUREAU - 49.

1860

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/25/55

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 43 cards were added to the Security Index and 13 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 30 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,748.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

## EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

To: O.S. Security Index Card Director, FBIDate February 7, 1955From: SAField Office or Division SAN FRANCISCO

**SUGGESTION:** Due to current Bureau instructions that require certification by the Field of the correctness of each Security Index card, many files will be analyzed in the immediate future in which it will appear logical and necessary to interview the subject to resolve the correctness of the SI classification. It is suggested in such cases that authority be given the SAC to direct Agents to conduct interviews

*of Security Index subjects*

**Its advantages are:** The SAC will be familiar with the facts involved in each situation and will be in a position to instruct an interview be attempted with a considerable savings in time (as contrasted with securing Bureau authority as is now necessary) in order to resolve the appropriateness of such Security Index classification. A savings would be effected in stenographic and clerical time, both at the Bureau and in the Field. In addition to the monetary saving incidental to the saving of employee time, the quality of the SI will be established much sooner.

**It should save at least \$3,000.00 annually.**

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

(Signature of Suggestor)

**Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:**

Since certification of the correctness of the Security Index is a deadline matter, this suggestion deserves favorable consideration.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: February 15,  
1955

TO :

FROM :

/ SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 75-55  
/ ELIMINATION OF BUREAU AUTHORITY  
/ PRIOR TO INTERVIEWS WITH SECURITY  
/ SUBJECTS)

The Special Agent of the San Francisco Office has recommended that in view of current Bureau instructions which require certifications by the field of the correctness of each Security Index card, many files will be analyzed in the immediate future in which it will appear logical and necessary to interview the subject to resolve the question as to whether his name should be retained on the Security Index. He suggests that in such cases authority should be delegated to the Special Agent in Charge to direct Agents to conduct interviews.

The SAC of the San Francisco Office feels that this suggestion deserves favorable consideration since certification of the correctness of the Security Index is a deadline manner.

The Executives Conference on September 27, 1954, considered the above suggestion and recommended unanimously that the present procedure of requiring Bureau authority prior to interviews with security subjects not be changed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division to indicate that the Internal Security Section does not favor the adoption of the above suggestion.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/23/55

FROM :

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #75-55  
MADE BY SA  
SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

SUGGESTION: Due to current Bureau instructions that require certification by the field of the correctness of each Security Index card, many files will be analyzed in the immediate future in which it will appear logical and necessary to interview the subject to resolve the correctness of the Security Index classification. It is suggested in such cases that authority be given the SAC to direct Agents to conduct interviews.

ADVANTAGES: The suggester states the SAC will be familiar with the facts involved in each situation and will be in a position to instruct or interview he attempted with a considerable savings in time in order to resolve the appropriateness of such Security Index classification. A savings would be effected in stenographic and clerical time, both at the Bureau and in the field. In addition to the monetary saving incidental to the saving of employee time, the quality of the Security Index will be established much sooner.

DISADVANTAGES: None noted by suggester.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC , San Francisco, feels this suggestion deserves favorable consideration.

Mr. , Domestic Intelligence Division, agrees with the unfavorable recommendation of Mr. . Mr. points out that the Executives Conference on September 27, 1954, considered the above suggestion and recommended unanimously that the present procedure of requiring Bureau authority prior to interviews with security subjects not be changed.

Inasmuch as the Bureau's position is obvious, this matter will not be presented to the Executives Conference unless you so instruct. Mr. has already been thanked for submitting this suggestion.

RECOMMENDATION:

Inasmuch as the Executives Conference unfavorably considered this matter as recently as September 27, 1951, it is recommended that this suggestion not be adopted.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 2/17/55

TO : MR. A. H.

FROM : MR. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX LIST

The Security Index list as of 2/15/55, has been prepared. One copy is attached herewith for transmittal to the SAC, Quantico, for retention in his personal custody with the other vital records maintained at the FBI Academy.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That this memorandum and attached list be forwarded to the SAC, Quantico, marked Personal and Confidential, Registered, Return Receipt Requested.

Rec'd 2/17/55  
2-23-55 - 7428

2. That upon receipt, the SAC, Quantico, place the attached list with the other vital records maintained at Quantico, personally destroy by burning the old Security Index list in his possession and note hereon that such action has been taken.

3. That thereafter, this memorandum be returned to the Bureau, marked for my attention.

Attachment (1) RECORDED - 60

WGO:mjt

(6)

cc - Mr. [REDACTED]

cc - Mr. [REDACTED]

cc - Mr. [REDACTED]

cc - SAC, [REDACTED]

cc - Mr. [REDACTED]

EX-112

10-3712-16-1664

13 MAR 2 1955

SAC [Signature]

6 MAR 7 1955

91-82

1865

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 3/4/55

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 9 cards were added to  
the Security Index and 70 cards were cancelled, a net  
decrease of 61 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is  
26,687.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (

DATE: 2/24/57

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AT KEY FACILITIES

Attached hereto is a rough draft letter from Hughes Aircraft Company at Culver City, Calif., which has been prepared by that company and forwarded to this office to ascertain whether the Bureau has any objections to a policy which Hughes wishes to adopt.

The Plant Protection Division of Hughes Aircraft Company is busy recruiting highly-trained engineering personnel from various sections of the country. They have advised that they realize that some of the personnel they hire might be missing security subjects from other field offices in the Bureau who have availed themselves of the opportunity of becoming employed by Hughes in California to completely drop from sight in their home cities.

Both Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted], who are heads of the plant security setup at Hughes, are ex-Bureau personnel and are fully aware of the confidential nature of the Bureau's files. Both Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] are extremely cooperative with the Los Angeles Office and, as a matter of information, forward a large amount of data which they accumulate in their own investigations which they think might be of interest to this office. *This is being done by the San Francisco S.P. Office*

The proposed letter is under no circumstances to be considered as a request for information. The letter is merely to be forwarded to the various field offices where the subject might have resided when he was hired. According to Mr. [redacted], this is not a wholesale project on the part of Hughes but will be done in only those cases where there is derogatory information which has been brought to light in the course of background investigations conducted by them which are necessary to clear their employees.

Mr. [redacted], who contacted the office, was advised that this matter would be referred to the Bureau for an opinion and that he would be appropriately advised as to whether or not the Bureau objected to his organization's adopting such a policy.

# HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY

*Division Hughes Tool Company*

CULVER CITY  
CALIFORNIA

Special Agent in Charge  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
U. S. Department of Justice  
(City and State)

RE: (Subject's name)

Dear Sir:

The Hughes Aircraft Company is a key facility engaged in the Research, Development, and Production of fire control systems, guided missiles, and other electronic devices for the armed forces. The Office of Special Investigations, 18th District, Cheli Air Force Depot, Maywood, California has security cognizance.

It should be noted that all employees of this Company are cleared for access to Confidential data; many are cleared for access to Secret; in some instances, clearances are given to Top Secret. Hence, the need for care in the selection of personnel is obvious.

Since the F.B.I. is charged with the investigation of violations of Espionage, Sabotage, and related matters, we are taking this means of bringing to your attention that captioned individual.



The subject's attached PSQ reflects that he (sh.) resided in your area for a period of time. It, therefore, is possible that you may have information which would assist the Government in arriving at a decision relative to the subject's clearance for access to classified information. It is stressed that this organization realizes that your records are confidential, and has no desire to be advised in this matter. Our only thought is to assist the Bureau in the fulfillment of its obligations, and to assure that this individual's employment is clearly consistent with the best interests of national security.

In the event information of an unfavorable nature is discovered here concerning this individual, your Los Angeles Division will be advised.

Yours very truly,

Enc 1

**Director of Industrial Security**

HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY

CULVER CITY  
CALIFORNIA

16 February 1955

Mr.  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
510 South Spring Street  
Los Angeles, California

RE: INFORMATION LETTERS TO YOUR OFFICES

Dear :

Reference is made to our telephone conversation February 16 at 8:45 a.m. at which time I broached the feasibility of our sending information letters to Bureau offices covering prior residence of our applicants whose application papers reflect Russian or satellite background.

My thinking is based on the understanding that many individuals in this category have subversive records; employment or application for employment in a defense industry enhances the significance of such subversive records; transfer of "run of the mill" subversives from one state or locality to another would not necessarily be brought to your attention; such transfer, if it involves seeking employment in a defense facility, might be of interest to the Bureau office covering prior residence to the extent that they would wish to reopen their case and submit any information in their possession to your office for your consideration and action.

In view of the above, I am enclosing a rough draft copy of the letter we propose to send to Bureau offices subject, of course, to your complete approval.

After you have examined the contents of this letter and attachment, I will welcome an opportunity to further discuss the matter with you.

Yours very truly,

2

188

SAC, Los Angeles ( )

March 4, 1955

Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

REGARDING THE PROPOSALS OF HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY

Reurlet dated February 24, 1955.

The form letter attached to relet to be put out over McCarthy's signature cannot be accepted. The appearance of such a letter would place an additional administrative burden on the Bureau. The use of such a form letter appears to be an attempt by Hughes Aircraft Company to develop a direct access to Bureau files in any matter in which they may be concerned. You are well aware that we cannot have such a development exist. In addition, the form letter proposed is undesirable on its own merits since the purpose it would serve is under the Voluntarism Agreement, the primary responsibility of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), United States Air Force which has security responsibility at Hughes Aircraft Company. Upon a request of OSI, name checks are made at the Bureau and where subservient information is developed, OSI must refer the case to us for investigation. The form letter proposed appears to be motivated by a desire to circumvent the OSI and allow Hughes Aircraft Company to refer matters directly to the Bureau. This would furnish Hughes Aircraft Company the opportunity at some later date to state they had referred the matter to the FBI.

You should advise (1) the form letter cannot be accepted by the FBI and (2) that the best interest of all concerned will best be served through continued proper coordination with OSI which has security responsibility at Hughes Aircraft Company.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

REGISTERED

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

~~FBI ST. LOUIS~~

3-4-55

AIRTEL

DIRECTOR, FBI

SECURITY INDEX REVIEW. RE SAC LET 55-8. (1) TOTAL NUMBER  
OF CASES TO BE REVIEWED - 139. (2) NUMBER OF CASES IN WHICH  
REQUIRED DATA FORWARDED TO BUREAU TO DATE - 36.

1863

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

-----4-----

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

~~FBI, CHARLOTTE (100-6562)~~ 3-4-55 AIRTEL

DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECURITY INDEX/ENVIRN. SEC. SAC LET 55-8, 2-2-55.~~

1. TOTAL CASES TO BE REVIEWED DURING PROJECT 47.
2. NUMBER CASES IN WHICH REQUIRED DATA FORWARDED TO BUREAU 47.

1867

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/21/55

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Attached is SAC Letter Number 55-15 (page one) of 2/17/55 providing that at the time a Form FD-122 is forwarded to the Bureau recommending a subject for the Security Index, there must be attached to it an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of the facts on which such recommendation is based. Further, it provides that in a case in which the subject is not being recommended for the Security Index, that the administrative page of the closing report shall contain a brief summary statement which reflects the reasons upon which such decision is based.


Proposed Manual changes are attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the attached proposed changes will be made in the Manual of Instructions. The FBI Handbook and the Manual of Rules and Regulations are not affected in this matter.

This was approved by Exec. Conf.  
Rheemo 2-14-55

1869



PERSON . ATTENTION  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
SAC LETTER NO. DD-15

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 17, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- In the future, at the time a Form FD-122 is submitted to the Bureau recommending the inclusion of a name in the Security Index, there must be attached to it an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of the facts on which you have based your recommendation for including the name in the Security Index. These facts must be in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and the sources from which the information came must be properly characterized as to reliability. The summary must also contain pertinent dates with respect to the activities of the subject.

In those instances when, at the conclusion of a security investigation, you are not recommending the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index, there shall be set forth on the administrative page of the closing report a brief summary statement which will reflect the reasons upon which you have based your decision.

Enc 1

February 21, 1955

PROPOSED CHANGES  
SECURITY INDEX  
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

*Page 29a-b - Under the heading "(4) Recommendations for, and preparation of Security Index cards," the following should be inserted following the existing first paragraph:*

"At the time a Form FD-122 is submitted to the Bureau requesting the inclusion of a name in the security index, there shall be attached to it a detailed summary of facts setting out a succinct summary of the facts on which such file is based, and the date. These facts must be in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of the basis for inclusion. The sources upon which the information or opinion may be prepared characterizes as to their validity. The summary must clearly indicate the specific report to the activities of the subject."

"In those instances when at the conclusion of a security investigation, a final administrative letter is issued, and such individual is not included in the security index, there shall be set forth on the administrative page of the closing report a brief statement indicating the reasons upon which such decision has been based."

*Under the heading f.(1)(a) pertaining to "Investigative reports" insert the following as the third and separate paragraph, immediately preceding the heading "(b) Summary Reports":*

"Upon completion of a security investigation of an individual not already included in the

Enc 2

Security Index, the procedure outlined in §7C  
7b (c) shall be followed. On recommendation  
recommendation of the fact that subject's  
name is not being recommended,  
if it is felt that subject should not be added  
to the security index, set one on the  
administrative page of the closing report  
a brief explanatory statement reflecting the  
reasons for such decision."

page 44a - Add the following as the last paragraph on the  
page:

"As noted in §7C 7b(4), in those instances  
when as the conclusion of a different  
investigation, subject's name is not being  
recommended for inclusion in the security  
Index, there shall be set one on the  
administrative page of the closing report  
a brief explanatory statement reflecting the  
reasons for which such decision has been  
based.

1870

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: Feb. 25, 1955

/ FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

In connection with the review of the entire Security Index which is currently being made by the field, we are receiving thousands of letters from our field offices which contain recommendations regarding the continuance or deletion of subjects from our Security Index.

In order that consistent evaluation will be afforded to the recommendations made by the various field offices after the Bureau Supervisor reviews the field recommendation, his work will be reviewed by Supervisor in Charge of the Security Index Unit

Supervisor ~~or~~ Supervisor Each of these three men is eminently qualified to handle this assignment and it would be physically impossible for Supervisor to review all of these cases alone; especially, since he along with Inspector and Section Chief of the Internal Security Section are personally passing on all new additions to the Security Index.

Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ is also personally handling all cancellations from the Security Index.

This system has been set up in order that we may keep as current as possible with the tremendous volume which is being received in the Internal Security Section while at the same time affording careful consideration to each individual case.

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION - RESTRICTED  
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

This memorandum is for record purposes only concerning  
with the conference held in the Attorney General's office  
starting at 3:00 pm, February 7, 1955, relative to the  
Justice Department's plans in the event of a possible open  
hostile situation. In addition to the Attorney General and the  
Director, the following were present:

From the Department - Deputy Attorney General and  
Legal Counsel

, Office of Legal  
Counsel;

From Immigration and Naturalization Service - General  
and Director

From FBI -

The Attorney General followed the subject section  
in his memorandum to [redacted] dated February 3, 1955.

A. Supervision of the Activities of Alien Chinese  
in this Country, Particularly Alien Chinese  
Scientists and Students

General [redacted] stated there were about 15,000 non  
immigrant Chinese in this country, of which approximately  
5,000 are students. He said there were about 10,000 other  
Chinese who are permanent residents, or a total of about  
45,000 Chinese aliens in the United States. [redacted]  
of Immigration and Naturalization Service advised us on  
February 4, 1955, that there were about 45,000 Chinese aliens.  
We are checking as to the difference in these figures.

The Director pointed out that of the 15,000 Chinese  
students and scientists who have been temporarily restricted  
from leaving this country, 3 are on our Section 3(a) list, and  
therefore, it would be very desirable that this furnish us

/

With a list of the 5,000 students in order that they could be checked out as to dangerousness. General [redacted] stated that the cards on all of 8,000 students are mixed in with the 15,000 cards on nonimmigrant Chinese as Central Intelligence. But that he could pick the cards out in about 24 hours in the event of an emergency. The Director pointed out that we should not wait until a "shooting war" has hit us, but that this information should be available now. General [redacted] said he would start a project to get the names to us. The Director pointed out this should not be delayed in order that we would have a chance to do our checking in advance of any emergency.

The Director further pointed out that under the revised Portfolio the arrest of dangerous aliens and a number of other functions performed during World War II by the United States Attorneys and the FBI have been placed under the jurisdiction of INS. The Attorney General questioned the advisability of this and after discussion made the ruling that the apprehension of any dangerous individuals under an emergency program should be the function of the FBI and the Portfolio is to so state.

B. Chinese on Security Index

The Director stated that there are 101 persons of Chinese national extraction in this country on our Security Index, 37 of them are aliens and 64 United States citizens. The Director pointed out that as to the aliens, there was no problem, inasmuch as in an emergency they could be picked up on deportation warrants. As to the citizens, he pointed out that they could not be arrested unless the writ of habeas corpus was suspended but that the FBI could intensify its coverage of these 64 in the event of an emergency which was short of implementing the entire Security Index program.

After discussion, the Attorney General agreed that in the event of a Formosan emergency, the 37 aliens would be picked up by the FBI on deportation warrants; that the FBI would see that the warrants were prepared for the Attorney General's signature and that we would intensify the coverage on the citizens. The Director pointed out we had located all of the aliens mentioned above within the last 48 hours.

\*We are checking with the Department as to the form of these warrants.

C. Chinese at the United Nations

The Director stated that of the Chinese employed at the UN, our investigations have reflected it to be dangerous and that the Department of State advised us on February 1, 1955, that the Chinese employed by the UN Communist should be considered as enemies of a friendly power and each case would be considered on its merits. Therefore, no Chinese individuals cannot be arrested, if in emergency occurs, we will intensify our coverage of them and immediately close their cases up with Assistant Attorney General [redacted], who can discuss them with the Department of State.

The Attorney General agreed with the above procedure.

D. Non-Chinese on the Security Index Who Are Sympathetic to Communist China

The Director stated that there are 34 individuals on our Security Index who are not Chinese but who are strongly sympathetic to Communist China. The Director pointed out that logically these would be treated in the same manner as the American citizens of Chinese extraction and, therefore, the FBI would increase and intensify its coverage on them in the event of an emergency.

The Attorney General agreed.

E. Status of Portfolio

Mr. [redacted] explained that the Legal Counsel's office is working on the Portfolio and is re-working the revised Portfolio in line with the comments made by the FBI. He said it would be necessary to take the matter up again with ISNS. General [redacted] stated that as the question of apprehensions has been settled by the Attorney General, he saw no need to have a long discussion with ISNS. The Attorney General asked when this would be completed. [redacted] said that Part I was practically finished, but that Part II would take longer to get into focus and he would try to complete the Portfolio by February 10. Meanwhile, the Attorney General stated that the Portfolio as it stood prior to the revisions would be operative in the event of an emergency.

The Director pointed out that the revised Portfolio contains a number of fundamental changes as to who would take

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

arrests and as to decisions and control of the Alien Enemy Program; that unlike during the last war, these functions were being shifted over to FIS, rather than remaining with the United States Attorneys and the FBI. The Director pointed out it had questioned this procedure in his comments to the Department. Again said that this was being worked out in accordance with the FBI's command and in accordance with the Attorney General's decision that arrests should be made by the FBI. The Director pointed out that the Office should also contain instructions to the United States Attorneys, the United States Marshals and others who would be involved.

The Director pointed out that it was of utmost importance to resolve this matter in the Portfolio so that responsibilities in an emergency could be clearly understood and carried out.

The Attorney General asked where the copy of the Portfolio are located. advised him that is one original portfolio, two one copy; the FBI has a copy; and a third copy is at Quantico. The Director verified this. As to the Portfolio being revised, said that at the time the Office took over, the Internal Security Division of the Department has one copy, and the FBI has one copy. ("I have verified the above, in so far as the FBI offices are concerned.)

F. Executive Order to Place Partial  
Security Inter Operations into Effect  
in the Absence of Martial Law.

It was agreed that the Executive Order should be issued in effect on the basis of the present situation.

G. Executive Order Freezing Assets, etc., etc.  
Abandonment of All.

The Attorney General, and I discussed this.

It still is could not be done under the present law. However, the Attorney General said that an Executive Order should be made ready to be used in the event the President desires in order to immediately hold the line on priors, assets, etc., in the event of an emergency. said he would prepare this.

U.S. AIR FORCE  
2-3-65

(a) We are checking with our stations as to the time  
of the earliest possible return even after they have picked  
up all the passengers still remaining.

3-1-55

(O) SECURITY INDEX -- The Bureau has approved a suggestion made by a field employee that the descriptive data presently appearing on the back of Security Index cards (in geographical section of the Index) be placed instead on separate card which will be securely attached to the Security Index card by staples. When a revised Security Index card is received from the Bureau and no changes are necessary in the descriptive data, the separate card can be removed and attached to the back of the new Security Index card to be filed in the geographical section of the Index. This will eliminate the necessity for retyping the descriptive data each time the Security Index card is revised.

It is not desired that a project be undertaken to prepare separate cards for all Security Index cards. The change in procedure should be made at the time of the next revision in each card. As each card comes up for revision, the Security Index data appearing on the card being replaced should be carefully crossed out. The back of the card being replaced already contains the necessary descriptive data; therefore, if no change is required in it, the back of the card being replaced can serve as the separate card which is to be stapled to the new Security Index card. This will make it unnecessary to retype the descriptive data on another card. (C)

Where a new Security Index card is received from the Bureau on a person not presently listed, or where a change is required in descriptive data on an existing card, the necessary descriptive data should be typed on a separate 5x8 card which will be attached by staples to the back of the Security Index card. For use in such instances, you should obtain from the Bureau an adequate supply of these cards on which have been printed the same descriptive items now appearing on the back of the Security Index card. The subject's photograph will, of course, be attached to the separate descriptive card.

It is intended that the separate card bearing the descriptive data continue to be filed with the copy of the Security Index card which is placed in the geographical section of the Index.

3/1/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-19

Appropriate manual changes will be made to reflect this new method of maintaining the descriptive data and photograph, but the procedure of using the replaced card as the separate card upon the inauguration of the new method will not be set out in the manual since eventually there will be no replaced Security Index cards useable in this manner.

March 8, 1955

SECURITY INDEX - [redacted]  
BUFILE

Attached is a letter from SAC [redacted] of San Francisco commenting upon the current review of Security Index cases. He has offered certain suggestions, summarized below, fully below, to which the Director has noted "Give careful consideration. H."

(1) SAC [redacted] states that, based on his personal review of some 200 Security Index cases, he has found that the cases are overwhelmingly in accord with the standards now in existence. He thus proposes that, if we are to reduce the over-all number of Security Index subjects, the existing standards should be revised. This matter has already been considered at the Bureau and Executives' Conference memorandum of March 3, 1955, dealing with proposed modifications in Security Index standards.

(2) With regard to SAC [redacted] second suggestion concerning the maintenance of cancelled Security Index cards, it is noted that cancelled cards are in fact filed separately under existing practice. The Statistical Section, upon the removal of subjects from the Index, retains the cancelled cards in a separate section easily accessible for review purposes in the event of an all out-war. The date of cancellation is noted specifically on each cancelled card and for that reason recourse may always be had to these cards bearing the most recent dates should a general review be deemed necessary. \*

(3) SAC [redacted] suggests that the files on individuals whose Security Index cards have been cancelled could be reviewed regularly, yearly or every eighteen months, "to determine whether or not their activity has increased to the point where they should be returned to the Security Index, and consideration could be given also to developing them as potential informants."

\* If the Department agrees with our proposed new criteria, we will consider having the field keep the cancelled cards separately for future reference. The field will be advised on this procedure, if approved, when the new criteria are sent to the field so it be instituted immediately.

I do not believe that this particular suggestion should be followed. First of all, the administrative details in running ticklers on the cancelled cases would present a tremendous problem. Secondly, should one of these individuals again become active in a subversive group, the office supervisor would bring him to appropriate attention. For instance, assume that a subject is removed from the Security Index in March 1955. In June 1956 an informant identifies the subject as engaged in Communist activities and a memorandum is channeled to the subject's case file. This memorandum will come to the attention of the Security Supervisor and at that point the case will be reopened for investigation.

It is further noted that we resolve the informant possibilities of each subject in working these cases. No person is removed from the Security Index until he has been interviewed unless, of course, there are specific overriding considerations which dictate against interview.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, there is attached a letter to SAC Whelan acknowledging his memorandum of March 1, 1955, and commenting upon his suggestions in line with the foregoing observations.

YMA 21402  
3-1-55

422 Federal Office Building  
Civic Center  
San Francisco 2, California  
March 1, 1955

PERSONAL

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In your talk with me in January, you emphasized that there is a need to review the Security Index cases, keeping in mind always that 1) we must protect the security of the nation on the one hand and 2) we must not open ourselves to criticism by having persons on the Security Index who do not belong there. It was your view that the number of persons on the Security Index at the present time should be substantially reduced.

Since returning to the office, I have reviewed approximately 200 Security Index cases. I don't know what the experience of the other field offices is in this regard but I would say generally that the recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and which have been concurred in by the Bureau, are overwhelmingly in accord with the standards which we have set up in our regulations.

I would respectfully and very seriously like to suggest and recommend that, if we are to reduce the over-all number of persons who are on the Security Index, to do it in an objective manner, the first step should be a revision of the standards which we consider sufficient to place a person upon the Security Index. In all frankness, I must admit that this is a change in my thinking. I had previously recommended to Mr. [redacted], when he inquired, that I didn't think a change in the standards was appropriate or necessary.

The Bureau has taken already one step in this direction by establishing the new standards for those persons who are to be given a priority of apprehension designation. The details of how the standards should be revised can be accomplished by those who are familiar with the problem.

I would further like to suggest that the Security Index Cards of the subjects whom we delete or cancel under the new standards be maintained separately. The files on these people could be reviewed perhaps every year or eighteen months to determine

- 2 -

whether or not their activity has increased to the point where they should be returned to the Security Index, and consideration could be given also to developing them as potential informants. If the cold war becomes more intense, we might want some day to be able to identify in a hurry this group of people on whom we now have some substantial information upon which to question their loyalty. The IBM cards have already been prepared on these people and, by maintaining them in a separate section, we would be able to continue to have control of them and have the information on these cards at our fingertips.

Very truly yours,

Special Agent in Charge

SAC, San Francisco

March 10, 1955

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SECURITY INDEX 14-10

Reference is made to your letter of March 1, 1955, commenting upon the review of Security Index cases.

You note that you have reviewed approximately 200 Security Index cases and have found that they are overwhelmingly in accord with the standards as they exist at the present time. You have suggested that, if the over-all number of persons in the Security Index is to be reduced, existing standards should be revised.

For your information, this matter is under study at the Bureau. You will be advised promptly of any developments in this matter.

You have suggested that the Security Index cards of the subjects removed from the Security Index as a result of any revision of the standards be maintained separately. The Security Index cards of persons removed from the Security Index are maintained separately at the Bureau under existing procedure. Since each cancelled card bears the date of cancellation, it will be possible at a later date to review the files of these subjects on a systematic basis should an emergency situation exist. Regarding the matter of revised Security Index standards, consideration will be given to separate maintenance by the field of cancelled Security Index cards for future reference.

Regarding your suggestion that the files of the cancelled subjects be reviewed periodically, this practice would entail a tremendous administrative burden in your office in following these cases. It is observed that should any of the cancelled subjects resume their activities in subversive groups your informant coverage should bring him to appropriate notice in your office. Assume, for instance, that a given subject is removed from the Security Index in March 1955. If an informant in June 1956 should report this subject as active in the Communist Party, the investigation would, at that point, be reopened in your office and appropriate recommendations made to the Bureau regarding his Security Index status.

REF ID: A6592

7-1-57

Lastly, it is noted that, upon the proposed periodic review of cancelled Security Index cards, consideration might be given to devolving those persons to potential informants. You are reminded that under existing instructions Security Index cards are not cancelled unless the subjects are considered for interview. The subjects are, in fact, interviewed unless specific overriding factors are present which dictate against the desirability of interviews in individual cases. In other words, the informant potential of each Security Index subject is examined in connection with cancellation of the Security Index card.

Your comments and observations in this matter are appreciated.

1871

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/16/55

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

By SAC Letter Number 55-12 of 2/10/55, attached, comprehensive changes were made in Security Index procedures regarding the priority to be given in apprehending the subjects. The classification of "Comsat" by which certain subjects were previously designated was discontinued entirely. Instead, the Detcom classification was established as the single basis of priority and that persons so classified will be arrested first in the event of a limited but grave emergency. In the event of an all-out emergency all subjects whose names are included in the Security Index will be considered for immediate apprehension.

Attached are Manual changes which are required under the changes brought about by the above SAC Letter. These changes relate exclusively to provisions under Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions and pertain to numerous phases of the Security Index Program which have now been altered pursuant to the aforementioned SAC Letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the attached proposed changes will be made in Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions.

February 10, 1967

PROPOSED CHANGES IN  
SECTION VI  
AND IN APPENDIXES

page 30a - Item VI should be read as follows:

VI. Emergency classification (where applicable)  
Detcom

page 30b - after the heading "(d) (3) II. Special Section" insert  
the following as the first and separate paragraph:

"Procedures affecting the alphabetical section of  
the Detcom Index for apprehension of  
subject or subjects in connection with  
the Detcom program."

page 30c - The third full paragraph beginning "When a subject  
is scheduled for priority apprehension ...." should  
be eliminated in its entirety.

page 30c - Under the heading "II. Alphabetical section" insert  
the following as the ~~third~~<sup>first</sup> full paragraph,  
~~immediately preceding the next heading "III. Special section."~~

"Procedures affecting the alphabetical section of  
the Detcom Index for apprehension of  
pertaining to the priority apprehension of  
subject or subjects in connection with  
the Detcom program."

page 30c - The first paragraph, beginning "When a Special  
Section subject...." should be amended to read as  
follows:

*6*  
when a Special Section subject is scheduled for  
priority apprehension under the Detcom program, the  
Special Section card shall be appropriately coded.

Enc. 1

? - 1

page 31b - In first paragraph after item (8) amend to read as follows:

Once a Security Index card has been prepared, any information developed which affects and adds appearing on said original Index card must be promptly submitted to the Bureau by Form 12-120. Any submission includes any changes, additions, or deletions involving the name, aliases, citizenship, organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendencies, present classification, date or place of birth, key activities, organizational identification number and agency security responsibility abbreviation (see OGA 7c(2) below) as well as residence of personnel concerned. (MURKIN's office of origin will be effected by submission of Form 12-120.)

Enc 2

- 1a -

page 32 - Item (c) under "Subjects Tabbed For Comadd and/or Detcom" should be amended to read:

(c) Subjects Tabbed For Detcom

page 32 Item (c) under above heading as changed should be amended to read as follows:

Upon the transfer of office of origin of a subject who has been tabbed for Detcom, the security index card will remain tabbed in the new office of origin as it was in the old office of origin. This shall apply in all instances including cases concerning Key Figures and Top Functionaries as well as cases carried under the Security Letter - C classification or cases carried under any other character such as Espionage - R or Internal Security - R.

page 32 - paragraph 2 under Item (c) above should be amended to read as follows:

The Security Index card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in the new office of origin until such time as it is determined by receipt of information by that office that the priority designation is not warranted under the provisions of Section 87A 7b (11), below.

page 32 - paragraph 3 under Item (c), above, beginning "The only exception to the above instructions....." should be deleted in its entirety.

pages 32b through 33b -- The existing unit under the heading "(11) Priority Apprehension Program" beginning at the bottom of page 32b and extending through the first paragraph on page 33b, is being completely revised to read as follows:

**(11) Priority Apprehension Program (DETCOM)**

(a) Purpose

Any individuals included in the Security Index card will be considered for apprehension for priority apprehension if they are engaged in espionage, sabotage, or treasonous activities, or if their whereabouts indicate that they would be

Enc 3 - -

more inclined to commit or capable of  
conducting acts of terrorism and should  
be arrested at the time of the coup d'etat.  
It is recommended that all Security Index  
subjects should be apprehended as soon as  
of such individuals is so determined, and in  
the interests of security they must be  
imprisoned in due course and prior  
to others in the common prison.  
Security Index subjects should be made  
conscious of a situation where it is referred  
to them as a fact that the subjects  
designated for priority apprehension are to  
be referred to as terrorist subjects.

It is planned that the individuals in the  
Security Index who should be arrested  
first in the course of a coup d'etat will be  
arrested as soon as the coup d'etat has  
been completed in due course and they will  
be arrested under section 8 of section 8.

In the event of an all-out emergency, all  
subjects listed in the index in the  
Security Index will be considered for  
immediate apprehension.

Subjects selected for Detcon should comprise  
a large number of communists. A large number  
of communists can be identified and the  
decision to consider a subject for priority of  
apprehension should be based on the subject's  
subversive activities and revolutionary experience.

(b) Subjects to be Tabled Detcon

Each Security Index subject should be considered  
for Detcon; namely (priority of arrest) to be held  
within one month of the following date:

I. All Top Functionaries and Key Figures

II. Currently active Communists (active within  
the People's Revolutionary Party of Chile)  
revolutionary organizations, and there is  
evidence of one or more of the following:

ENC 4

- (A) Activity as local organizer or leader in the organization.
- (B) Special training at the Lenin School or at other institute in Moscow.
- (C) Participation as picket captain, strong-arm, or active participant in violent示威, riots or demonstrations.
- (D) Violent statements or strong radicalism, or violence shown by their associates.
- (E) Persons active in Communist Party underground.
- (F) Any other Security Index subject whose individual, group or organization, reputation or character, up to a point, reflects the individual's political affiliation, activities, intent or dispositions in a favorable or unfavorable light.

ENC 5

(c) Recommendations for and Removal of Detcom

I. Approval of Special Agent in Charge

The designation of each subject for the Detcom program or the removal of any subject from it must be personally requested by the Special Agent in Charge, or by a representative of the Security Index Subjects by the Special Agent in Charge, and is to be countersigned by the supervisor. If the initial subjects being recommended for designation for Detcom, the above-requested approval by the Special Agent in Charge in conformance with the requirements specified in O/C YR 141.

In recommendations for Detcom designation of subjects already included in the security Index, the Special Agent in Charge (or in offices using more than 1,000 security Index subjects, the C.I. Unit, or Bureau) may indicate (in the margin) that personally he has determined that the subject indicated on or removed by marking an "X" in the space following the word "for" .

Such approval must be noted specifically on a cover letter, transmitting documents as an enclosure, the word "for" being put briefly and succinctly before the reason for designating the subject for the secret classification.

II. Key Figure and Top Functionary Cases

As noted in O/C YR 141 (2) and (3), it is necessary that the request be submitted in this specific form if the subject is to be recommended for designation as either a Key Figure or a top functionary. It is

ENC 6

*Registration Name* John D. Smith

Circle Two of the four lines below that best fit the data in the table

Year      Population      Year      Population

1900            100  
1910            120  
1920            140  
1930            160  
1940            180  
1950            200  
1960            220  
1970            240  
1980            260  
1990            280  
2000            300

the following equation best fits the data

y = 2x + 100

y = 100x + 200

y = 200x + 100

y = 100x + 200

Journal of Economic Statistics Volume 27  
2005 ISSN 0266-6473 Printed in Great Britain

in letters or telegrams

### (d) Administrative Functions for Various Types of Events

In order that the Security Index card for the subjects  
to be examined 1300 hours tomorrow at 0800 hours, it is  
desirable to have the following information:

- I. Each Security Index case should be considered for  
probation or parole if it is believed that  
the person is no longer a threat to society.

II. Categorical Section

## II. Geographical Section

The favorable location of your property is  
simply superb and will continue to be so.  
Very good investment opportunity.  
Call or write for further information.  
Very sincerely yours,  
John C. H. F. [Signature]

Part II of the Constitutional Section will  
consist of a Constitution and a  
Statute of the Commonwealth.

In addition to the above, we have an additional  
category of species -- those which are  
adapted and temperate-temperate --  
which will be found in the same  
category as the first two parts I  
and II. In the same way, there  
are other groups which will  
be separated from the others from  
the other categories.

Under the above circumstances it will not  
be necessary to file copies with the  
Commissioner of Patents or the  
Secretary of State.

### III. Administrative Section

One favorite index card for each subject  
is to be filled in the sample I mention  
in the first section of this page. It can  
be used over and over.

A colored tab will be affixed to each Security  
in red, blue, green, yellow, or orange.

As Detcon tabbing are approved at the time of  
the inspection, it is recommended that the field  
will use only current Detcon tabbing.  
Now to the first line on page 8, it is even  
easier to read as it is printed in large  
red letters.

#### IV. Special Section and Unavailable Section

Security Index cards of Patagon subjects filed  
in L. I. 1921/22  
designed by Mr. E. C. Sibley, etc.

Enc 8

(el) GeneralI. Tabbing of Cards

No Security Index card will contain tabs for subjects longer than 10 characters and no more than 10 lines of text.

II. Removal from System Category

Particular attention must be given to cases in which removal from the security index is required. A report of this handling should be made to the responsible authority. In addition, such removals should be recorded and the subject removed from the system category for future reference. In case of the removal of a subject, the security classification and category must be checked for correctness for each record covered in the (el) category.

page 33c - Under the heading "(2) Inclusion in the Security Index," the fourth paragraph beginning "The Security Index card for each key facility subject ..." should be deleted in its entirety.

page 33c - First paragraph on the page beginning "If a subject discontinues ..." should be deleted in its entirety.

Under the heading "(1) General" the following should be inserted as the fourth and separate paragraph:

As noted under 077-28 (11) herein, the Security Index card containing the subject and its categories must be under lock or private protection.

page 35 - Under the heading "(1) Designation and deletion of Key Figure status," the following should be inserted as the first and separate paragraph:

The following provisions should be read in conjunction with 077-28 (11) regarding the categories of subjects in specific reference to those to Key Figures.

ENC 9

page 35 -

Existing paragraph one, beginning "An individual is designated a Key Figure....." should be amended to read as follows:

An individual is designated a Key Figure by the Field Office by directing a letter to the Bureau advising that an individual has been so classified. Deletions are made in the same manner. The letter designating or deleting a Key Figure should carry the name of the subject in the caption and contain a brief statement as to the reason for such designation or deletion.

page 36 -

Under the heading "VII. Maintenance of Key Figure List," the first paragraph beginning "Each office must maintain..." should be amended to read as follows:

Each office must maintain a list of Key Figures including top Functionaries. The list may be kept by a simple list system, by maintaining a file wherein all additions and deletions to the list are reported or by a card index system. The number of Key Figures a particular office has will govern the method which is used. The Bureau does not desire, however, that the Security Index cards of Key Figures be tabbed except to denote the Detcom classification as outlined in C.I. 70 (11), herein. The Key Figure list should be maintained separate from the Security Index.

page 36 -

Immediately after the heading "(3) Top Functionaries" at the bottom of the page, the following should be inserted as a separate paragraph:


The following provisions should be read in conjunction with C.I. 70 (11) concerning the Detcom program. Wherein specific reference is made to top functionary subjects.

ENC 10

page 44a - Second full paragraph under heading "(a) General" under item (ii), should be amended to read as follows:

Any reference to the Communist Index, Security Index, file numbers, titles of other cases, priority apprehension program, Detcon classification, Key Figure or Top Functionary status, Security Flash Notice (FD-105), Forms FD-122 and FD-123, Bureau instructions for handling cases, or any information contained in Bureau or field correspondence which is not investigative in nature but refers to the administrative handling of the case.

Enc 11



1871 PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC'S FILE NUMBER 55-12

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 10, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- In view of recent developments in the international situation it has become necessary to re-evaluate the priority of arrest features of our Security Index Program. At the present time subjects who will be considered for priority of arrest at the time of an emergency are tabbed Detcom and the Detcom classification includes subjects who are tabbed Comsab.

Henceforth, it is planned that the individuals in the Security Index tabbed Detcom will be arrested first in the event of a limited but grave emergency. It is not anticipated at this time that the other subjects in the Security Index will be arrested under such a situation. (In the event of an all-out emergency all subjects whose names are included in the Security Index will be considered for immediate apprehension.)

In order that the most dangerous persons will be apprehended during a limited but grave emergency, there are set forth below the new standards to be used in deciding who should be listed for priority of apprehension and Detcom tabbing.

1. The Comsab tabbing is to be discontinued.
2. Each Security Index subject should be considered for Detcom tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of the following categories:
  - a. All Top Functionaries and Key Figures.
  - b. Currently active Communists (active within the past year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or more of the following:
    - (1) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization.
    - (2) Special training at the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow.
    - (3) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men or active participation in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.
    - (4) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities.

1871

ENCLOSURE /2

- c. Persons active in the Communist Party underground.
- d. Any other Security Index subject who, existing, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent or disruptor in the event of an emergency.

Subjects who will be tabbed Detcom should comprise a hardcore of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own and the decision to consider a subject for clarity of apprehension should be based on the subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies. Employment in a key position will no longer be a reason alone for Detcom tabbing.

In evaluating each Security Index case it will be necessary to review each case file. This should be done in connection with the review of all Security Index cases in accordance with the instructions in SAC Letter Number 55-12 dated February 4, 1955. In submitting your personal recommendation for retaining a subject in the Security Index you should also submit your recommendation regarding the Detcom tabbing as indicated above along with your reasons why the subject meets the new Detcom standards in sufficient detail to justify your recommendation. If a subject is tabbed Detcom and Comsab at this time and you are not recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions you should submit a Form FD-122 attached to your Security Index recommendation in order to delete the Detcom and Comsab tabbing. If you are recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions and the subject is already tabbed Detcom, you should so advise the Bureau and Form FD-122 need not be submitted. In instances in which you are recommending the Detcom tabbing and the subject is already tabbed Detcom and Comsab you should attach a Form FD-122 in order that the Comsab tabbing can be deleted. Of course, if the subject is not already tabbed Detcom and you are recommending such tabbing under the new instructions, you should attach a Form FD-122 to your Security Index recommendation in order that the Detcom tabbing can be added to the Security Index card.

There will be instances in which you have already submitted your recommendations that a Security Index subject should be retained in the Security Index. In these instances it will be necessary for you to recheck the individual case files to determine whether a Detcom tabbing is necessary and to advise the Bureau in accordance

2/10/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

EAC/AB

with the above instructions.

In order that the Security Index cards for the subjects who are to be tabbed Detcom for priority of apprehension, as indicated above, will be readily available for emergency action in your office you should be guided by the following instructions regarding the arrangement of your Security Index.

1. Each Security Index case should be considered for Detcom tabbing whether the subject's Security Index card is filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of your Security Index. However, there is no change being made in the instructions regarding the Security Index cards which are to be filed in those three sections.

2. The Geographical Section of your Security Index should be divided into two distinct parts. Part I of the Geographical Section shall include only the Security Index cards for subjects who are tabbed Detcom under the new instructions set out above. Part II of the Geographical Section will contain the Security Index cards for all subjects that are not tabbed Detcom.

3. In offices having a Geographical breakdown by residence and by employment it will be necessary to have two breakdowns for each of those categories in order that the cards tabbed Detcom will be separated and maintained apart from the cards not so tabbed.

4. You should continue to file one Security Index card for each subject in the Alphabetical Section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever. To assist you in readily identifying Security Index cards in the Alphabetical Section that will be tabbed Detcom under the new instructions a colored metal tab shall be fastened to each such card.

For your information, in the future as Detcom tabbings are approved the Security Index cards forwarded to you will not only carry the code letters DC in the first line on the cards but each such card will be stamped Detcom in large red letters. This procedure will assist you in being absolutely certain that cards tabbed Detcom are properly filed.

2/10/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

Enc 14

The Detcom tabbing of a Security Index subject should be afforded your personal consideration and you will include your personal recommendations for such tabbing during this review and in the future. In handling this matter in connection with your review of all Security Index cases you should make the guidelines as set forth in SAC Letter 55-8 dated February 2, 1955. Security Index cards presently tabbed Detcom should not be placed in the new Detcom portion of the Geographical Section of your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations. There should be no changes made regarding the present Detcom tabbings in your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations under the new procedure. In this manner the entire Security Index will be reviewed and reconsideration given to Detcom tabbings by the periods indicated in SAC Letter Number 55-8.

In view of the new and separate breakdown in the Geographical Section of your Security Index for Detcom subjects it will no longer be necessary to place a separate tag on such cards as you have done in the past.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2/10/55  
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

Enc 15